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I. INTRODUCTION

With the foregoing article' Scott and Bryant have unofficially
sounded the clarion, announcing that the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of West Virginia intends to target the
environmental practices of the coal industry just as it has waged its

war on public corruption.' The new arrow that the United States
Attorney's Office has removed from its quiver and aimed at the coal
industry is the threat of criminal prosecution under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act).3 Scott and Bryant, on behalf
of that office, recently unleashed the full resources of the United
States government to prosecute Lewis R. Law, a small coal operator,
and his company Mine Management, Inc. (MMI. On November 15,
1991, Mr. Law and MMI were found guilty on sixteen counts of
knowingly discharging without a permit, in violation of the Clean
Water Act.4 Mr. Law was personally sentenced to twenty-four months
in prison and fined $80,000 ($5,000 per count). Defendant MMI was

1. Philip B. Scott & S. Benjamin Bryant, Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Water
Act in the Coal Fields: United States v. Law and Beyond, 95 W. VA. L. Rav. 663 (1993).
2. Between 1984 and 1988 the United States Attorney's Office obtained the convictions of 75 public officials for public corruption related offenses. Michael W. Carey et al.,

Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to Punishing
Breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposalfor Reform, Part One & Two, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 301 & 989 (1991-92).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988).
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also fined $80,000. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently upheld both convictions in a per curiam5 opinion and
the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.
Having emerged victorious in this minor criminal prosecution,
which has become a cause celebre in some circles,6 the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of West Virginia appears
poised for its next target within the coal industry. The threat of criminal prosecution is not new in the coal industry' but, given the many
forums the coal industry may choose to litigate its compliance with
environmental regulations, appearing as a defendant in United States
District Court, under an indictment for violations of the Clean Water
Act, is not one of the options a company would voluntarily select for
itself or its officers. s As the Scott and Bryant article illustrates, the
United States Attorney's Office has selected the criminal forum to
prosecute the coal industry because, that office believes, that is the
best forum to achieve greater compliance with environmental regulations.9 Regardless of whether or not the prosecution of Mr. Law and
5. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert denied, 113
S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
6. See Peter Samuel, Bankrupted by EPA, NAT'L REV., Mar. 16, 1992, at 38-39.
7. The coal industry has historically been prosecuted for violations of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1988). See, e.g., United States
v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984); United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 504 F.2d 1330 (6th Cir. 1974).
8. A review of the transcript of the trial conducted in Mr. Law's case illustrates the
unfriendly atmosphere an individual and company may encounter when they are called upon
to defend their environmental conduct under criminal indictment. See discussion infra part
IV. In a civil environmental case, each side will usually rely upon the testimony of expert
witnesses. In Mr. Law's criminal trial, the district court entered an evidentiary ruling preventing Mr. Law's geotechnical expert, George Hall Ph.D., from testifying about the source
of the water pollution emanating from the gob pile. Joint Appendix at 280-81 [hereinafter
J.A.], United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844
(1993). After further briefing and argument the district court allowed limited inquiry of Mr.
Hall as to the source of the water pollutants, id at 282-83, but when Mr. Hall renewed his
testimony the district court remonstrated the government for not objecting to a line of inquiry and the district court imposed further limitations on the defendant's expert testimony. Id
at 288A-288D.
9. The United States Attorney's Office argues that the successful prosecution of Mr.
Law and several other notable criminal prosecutions will have a substantial deterrent effect
and lead to greater compliance with the Clean Water Act. See Scott & Bryant, supra note
1, at 665. For a contrary opinion indicating that environmental criminal prosecutions do not
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his company and future criminal prosecutions of other parties in the
coal industry will have any major impact on the coal industry's compliance with environmental regulations, one may predict that criminal
prosecutions under the Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes will increase in the future.' 0
The immediate impetus of this Article is the recent criminal convictions of 1'Jr. Law and his company. These recent convictions, along
with the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit'1 upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) proposed storm water regulations for active and inactive coal
operations, 2 have exponentially increased the potential for parties
within the coal industry 'to be held criminally liable under the Clean
Water Act. This Article will examine these recent decisions, as well as
other developments in the area of environmental criminal liability, in
order to fully examine the increased potential for coal companies and
their officers to be held criminally liable under the Clean Water Act.
The next section of this Article will provide an overview of the
Clean Water Act. The third section analyzes criminal prosecutions for
have a deterrent effect because they discourage self-policing environmental audits, see James
R. Moore & Perkins Cole, Environmental Criminal Statutes: An Effective Deferent?, C776
ALI-ABA, 137, 139 (Sept. 1992), available in WESTLAW, ENV-TP database.
10. Recently, Martin Harell, Region I Criminal Enforcement Counsel wrote Dr. Eli
McCoy, Director of the Water Resource Section, West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection, suggesting that Region III was interested in coordinating with the State of West
Virginia in more criminal enforcement actions against surface and deep mine operators who
either have or should have NPDES permits under the Clean Water Act. Letter from Martin
Harell, Region III Criminal Enforcement Counsel to Dr. Eli McCoy, Director of the Water
Resource Section, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (Feb. 19, 1993) (on
file with author). See More Criminal Enforcement, Bigger Penaltiesfor Polluters Predicted
in New Administration, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1867 (1992); see also Companies' Fear of
Environmental Disclosure Has No Basis, Top EPA Enforcement Official Says, 23 Env't.
Rep. (BNA) 24 (1992). Another indication that criminal prosecutions will continue to grow
arises from congressional demands made by "watch-dog" committees that have criticized the
Department of Justice for lax enforcement of environmental laws. See Report Alleges Justice
Department Failure to Prosecute Environmental Crimes Vigorously, 23 Env't. Rep. (BNA)
1710 (1992).
11. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 48,065 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(14)(iii)).
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knowing violations under the Clean Water Act and other environmental
laws with an emphasis on corporate and individual liability. The fourth
section examines the case of Mr. Law and MMI and the lessons to be
learned from that criminal prosecution. The fifth section examines
EPA's new storm water regulations and their potential impact on the
coal industry. The sixth section sets forth recommendations to minimize criminal liability, and it capsulizes, in an abbreviated fashion,
strategies and tactics to be considered in defending the coal industry in
environmental criminal prosecutions.
I.

A.

OVERVIEW OF THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

A NPDES Permit is Required for all Point Source Discharges

Congress first enacted the Clean Water Act in 1948, but it did not
become the comprehensive regulatory statute, as we now know it, until
it was amended in 1972.13 On a national level, the EPA has the primary responsibility to enforce the Clean Water Act by establishing
limitations for industrial discharges into the nation's waters and by
requiring monitoring and self-reporting of those discharges 4 . The primary mechanism utilized by the EPA to regulate water pollution discharges is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit process.1 5 Under the Clean Water Act, every discharge of pollutants into a navigable water of the United States requires a NPDES permit. 16 The NPDES permit sets forth the "effluent
limits," or the amount of pollution a company or individual can discharge into a stream based upon the water quality and other characteristics of that stream and various technology based standards. 7

13. For a discussion of the history of the Clean Water Act and its subsequent amendments, see CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK (1988); EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 202-09 (1975); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d
692, 695-97 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-18 (1988)
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. 1991). This permit is commonly referred to as
a NPDES permit.
16. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
17. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1317 (1988).
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Under the Clean Water Act a NPDES permit must be obtained
before anyone can discharge a pollutant from a point source into a
navigable water of the United States. Each one of the italicized terms
in the preceding sentence is a term of art and each term is crucial to
an understanding of the legal duties under the Clean Water Act. The
discharge of a pollutant is defined as the addition of a man made or
created substance into a navigable water."' In every day mining terminology, acid mine drainage or any other polluted drainage, (including water carrying sediments) from a mine portal, settling pond, coal
refuse or gob pile, or a preparation plant, could constitute the discharge of a pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act.
The Clean Water Act defines a point source as a discrete conveyance,,9 and that definition includes metal or plastic pipes, concrete
channels, or ditches eroded in the soil where water flows from a coal
refuse or gob pile.20 A navigable water of the United States is de18. The term "pollutant" is defined under the Clean Water Act as:
[D]redged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge,
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal,
and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term does not mean (A) "sewage
from vessels" within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas,
or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or
gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in
a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is
approved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if such State
determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of
ground or surface water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988). The term "discharge of a pollutant" is defined in the Clean
Water Act as:
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B)
any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean
from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988).
19. "Point source" is defined under the Clean Water Act as:
[A]any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural
storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
20. In Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980), the court
of appeals defined a point source associated with mining operations under the Clean Water

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/7

6

Arceneaux: Potential Criminal Liability in the Coal Fields under the Clean W

1993]

CWA PROSECUTIONS-A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

fined broadly to include all waters, 21 not just those navigable, and it
Act as follows:
Gravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part
of a point source discharge if the miner at least initially collected or channeled the
water and other materials. A point source of pollution may also be present where
miners design spoil piles from discarded overburden such that, during periods of
precipitation erosion of spoil pile walls results in discharges into a navigable body
of water by means of ditches, gullies and similar conveyances, even if the miners
have done nothing beyond the mere collection of rock and other materials. The
ultimate question is whether pollutants were discharged from "discernible, confined,
and discrete conveyance[s]" either by gravitational or nongravitational means. Nothing in the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the operators did not
actually construct those conveyances, so long as they are reasonably likely to be
the means by which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of
water. Conveyances of pollution formed either as a result of natural erosion or by
material means, and which constitute a component of a mine drainage system, may
fit the statutory definition and thereby subject the operators to liability under the
Act.
Id at 45; see also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.
1979) ("The concept of a point source was designed to further this scheme [of full pollution regulation] by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance
from which pollutants might enter the waters of the United States."); United States v.
Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the defendant's placement of plastic
bags containing contaminated blood vials constituted a point source discharge without a
NPDES permit). But see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir.
1976) (striking down EPA's rainwater runoff regulations for coal areas holding that even
though the point source definition is broad, "it does not include unchanneled and uncollected surface waters.").
21. "Waters of the United States" is defined in the code of federal regulations as follows:
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands";
(c) All other waters, such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands", sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which would
affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such water,
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate
or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in
interstate commerce.
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States
under this definition;

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:691

has been specifically held
to include creeks, streams, lakes and every
22
other type of waterway.
Given the broad definitional terms under the Clean Water Act, all
active coal mines have historically obtained NPDES permits because
"polluted" water drained from the mining operations and it inevitably
flowed into streams, creeks, or rivers.23 Despite the coal industry's
historical intent to comply with the Clean Water Act, water pollution
problems have persisted in the coal fields as a result of acid mine
drainage from abandoned mines and other problems associated with the
coal industry.24 Before turning to a discussion of the potential for
criminal liability in the coal fields under the Clean Water Act, a discussion of recent civil developments in West Virginia is in order to
appreciate the increasing magnitude of civil liability for water pollution
problems and 5the impact that may have on criminal liability for the
coal industry.2

(e) Tributaries of water identified in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this definition;
(f) The territorial sea; and
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this definition.
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designated to meet
the requirements of the Adt (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 C.F.R.
423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition are not waters of the
United States.
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1992).
22. In United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974),
the court of appeals refused to strictly interpret the term "navigable waters of the United
States" in part based upon the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966), that the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, should
not be strictly construed, but rather, construed consistent with "common sense, precedent,
and legislative history." See United States v. Cumberland Wood Chair Corp., 978 F.2d 1259
(6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
23. Until recently, thousands of inactive mines have discharged pollutants into waters
of the United States without any requirement of obtaining a federal or state NPDES permit.
Until recently, the EPA and the State had decided not to regulate inactive mines. As will
be discussed in part V of this Article, EPA's new storm water regulations significantly
change this historical practice.
24. Scott & Bryant go to some length in their article to discuss the problems of acid
mine drainage and the fact that at least 10,000 miles of streams in Appalachia have been
degraded. Scott & Bryant, supra note 1, at 668.
25. It should be noted that EPA and the states have the choice to proceed with either
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699

B. Emerging Trends in Civil Liability in West Virginia
1.

Successor Operator Liability

While the Clean Water Act requires a coal operator to obtain a
NPDES permit for its discharges into a stream, what happens when the
coal company ceases mining and a third party buys the property for
commercial development unrelated to coal mining? In Rayle Coal Co.
v. Chief, Div. of Water Resources,26 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals answered this question and concluded that the purchaser of
a tract of land that had been previously mined had a duty to remain in
compliance with the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (West
Virginia Act)27 even though the party had no intention of mining the
28
property.

civil or criminal enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123
(3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391
F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENviRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY VIOLATOR (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter
DOJ GUIDANCE DOCUMENT], which is discussed further in part VI, is utilized by the Department of Justice to determine when cases should be prosecuted criminally. The State of
West Virginia has no similar policy document and therefore, it is entirely discretionary on
the State's part to refer a case to the United States Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution.
26. 401 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1990).
27. W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5A-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1992). The West Virginia Act is
substantially similar to the Clean Water Act. In West Virginia, since 1982, the Water Resources Section, Division of Environmental Protection [hereinafter DEP] (formerly Division
of Natural Resources) has been delegated the primary authority from EPA to issue NPDES
permits for all industries. 40 C.F.R. § 123.62 (1992). DEP administers the NPDES program
for non-coal discharges through the regulations promulgated at 46 W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 2-1 to
18 (1992). NPDES permits for the coal industry are prepared by the Mines and Minerals
Section of DEP (formerly Division of Energy) pursuant to similar regulations promulgated at
47 W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 30-1 to 15 (1992). At any point in time that the EPA is not satisfied
with the State's enforcement of the West Virginia Act, EPA may step in and request modification of the State's program. West Virginia Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276
(S.D. W. Va. 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1991).
28. It is worth noting that the facts in Rayle Coal Company are remarkably similar to
the facts in Law. See discussion infra part IV. Rayle Coal Company was cited by the United States Attorney's Office in its brief before the United States Court of Appeals for the

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:691

Rayle Coal Co. involved Valley Camp Coal Company's previous
operations of a mine and preparation plant near Tridelphia, Ohio County, West Virginia. As with all such operations, Valley Camp generated
a large coal refuse or gob pile as a waste product from the operation
of its preparation plant, and it placed the waste at the head of Storch's
Run Hollow. A sediment pond was built at the base of the gob pile,
and water from the pond was pumped over a hill to Valley Camp's
water treatment facility where the water was treated for acid mine
drainage. Valley Camp had a NPDES permit that allowed for the treatment and discharge of acid mine drainage from the gob pile.
Rayle Coal Company purchased the property with the intention of
abandoning 'Valley Camp's coal mining operations and developing the
property for commercial non-mining purposes. When Rayle Coal Coin*pany purchased the property it no longer had access to Valley Camp's
water treatment facility, so it discontinued pumping the water over the
hill and instead set up a series of ponds and ditches allowing the
water/acid mine drainage to flow untreated into Storch's Run.
The Division of Water Resources found the measures taken by
Rayle Coal Company were inadequate to stop the acid mine drainage
and ordered Rayle Coal Company to take corrective action to treat the
water pollution and apply for a state NPDES permit. The matter was
litigated for a number of years, and the case ultimately landed in the
Supreme court of appeals of West Virginia. The court held that the
discharge of acid mine drainage into the creek required a state NPDES
permit. The court specifically rejected Rayle Coal Company's argument
that it did not need to obtain a state NPDES permit because it had
never conducted any coal mining operations on the property and the
mining operations were abandoned. In Rayle Coal Co. the court held:
The West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act does not require an application for a permit only for active business operations. In fact, W.Va.
Code, 20-5A-11 [1969] provides in relevant part: "When such person is
ordered to take remedial action and does not elect to cease operation of

Fourth Circuit, for the proposition that Mr. Law and MMI were required under the Clean
Water Act to obtain a NPDES permit, although it admitted that Rayle Coal Company arose
under the West Virginia Act not the Clean Water Act. Brief of Appellee at 34-35, United
States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
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the establishment deemed to be the source of such pollution, or when such
ceasing does not stop the pollution, he [or she] shall forthwith apply for a
permit[.]" (emphasis added) Accordingly, the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act, W.Va. Code, 20-5A-1 to 20-5A-24, as amended, requires
an applicationfor a permit when the cessation of business operations does
not stop the pollution.29

Therefore, the court recognized that the emphasis under the West Virginia Act is not on what person or company created the water pollution problem or whether or not the coal mining operations continued
on the property. Rather, the inquiry is on whether or not the water
pollution continues after the mining operations have ceased. Rayle
Coal Co., illustrates that coal operators and the purchasers of coal
property have continuing legal liabilities as long as polluted water
continues to discharge from the property into a stream or other regulated water way. As discussed further in part VI, in this era of increased
environmental enforcement, companies need to analyze and understand
environmental statutes so that they can be better prepared to address
their potential environmental problem areas. The result of a failure to
comply with the Clean Water and West Virginia Acts may be civil
liability, as occurred in Rayle Coal Co., or failure to comply may
result in criminal liability as occurred in the case of Mr. Law and
MMI, discussed in part IV. Most companies would prefer not to be
the target of an environmental enforcement action. If it is a target, a
company will generally prefer to keep its case in the civil enforcement
arena rather than face criminal enforcement. By proper attention to the
legal responsibilities under the Clean Water Act, a company should be
able to minimize its liability exposure.
2.

Third-Party Liability

One more recent development under the West Virginia Act, arising
in Preston County, West Virginia, warrants additional examination as it
epitomizes the changing regulatory climate regarding the Clean Water
and West Virginia Acts and the expenses that can be involved in
achieving compliance with environmental statutes. F&M Coal Company

29. 401 S.E.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
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conducted a surface mining operation on Laurel Mountain in Preston
County, between 1984 and 1991.30 F&M apparently had extensive
water pollution problems at the site as a result of acid mine drainage.
Because of this and other problems with the operation, F&M filed for
bankruptcy in October, 1990. In December, 1990, it auctioned off its
assets for $1.5 million. Those proceeds were utilized by F&M to treat
acid mine drainage at the Laurel Mountain mining operations. Treatment for the acid mine drainage cost approximately $50,000 per
month,1 and by March, 1992, most of the company's money had dissi3
pated.
During the life of the coal mining operations, the State evidently
was not satisfied with the environmental performance of F&M as it
issued a total of fifty-six notices of violations of the West Virginia
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act (West Virginia Surface
Mining Act).32 In June, 1991, a show cause hearing was set for F&M
to demonstrate why its permit should not be revoked and its bonds
forfeited.33 After some negotiation, F&M decided not to challenge the
State permit and bond revocation proceedings and F&M surrendered its
permits and bonds in March, 1992. The West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection (DEP) took no immediate action to remediate
the acid mine drainage and a citizen group brought a mandamus action
against DEP to compel immediate remediation of the F&M Laurel
Mountain site, in State ex rel Laurel Mountain v. Callaghan.34 In
Laurel Mountain, the court issued a writ of mandamus against DEP
and required it to take any money collected pursuant to the bond for-

30. The background facts regarding the operations of F&M are from the West Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel. Laurel Mountain v. Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580,
582-83 (W. Va. 1992), and the record before the Water Resources Board in Cat Run Coal
Co. v. Chief, Office of Water Resources, Consolidated Appeal Nos. 527, 528 and 529
(1992) [hereinafter Water Resources Board Record].
31. Order of the Water Resources Board Record, In Re: F&M Coal Company Limited
Partnership,No. 90-10929 (N.D. W. Va. March 13, 1992).
32. W. VA. CODE §§ 22A-3-1 to -40 (1985 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter West Virginia
Surface Mining Act].
33. The permit and bond forfeiture provisions under the West Virginia Surface Mining
Act are codified at W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-17 (Supp. 1992).
34. 418 S.E.2d 580 (W. Va. 1992).
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feiture proceedings and begin immediate remediation efforts with regard to the acid mine drainage problems.
The court's decision in Laurel Mountain led DEP to take the
unprecedented action35 of issuing orders against Donald R. Frazee, a
former partner in F&M, Inter-State Lumber Company, the surface
owner of the property at Laurel Mountain where F&M conducted its
mining operations, and Cat Run Coal Company, the mineral owner
of
the property at Laurel Mountain where F&M conducted its operations.
At the time DEP issued the orders, all three parties had no control
over F&M's mining operations. Moreover, Cat Run Coal Company and
nter-State Lumber Company had never had any connection with the
mining operations or the creation of the acid mine drainage. Nevertheless, all three parties were ordered to take corrective and remedial
action to eliminate the water pollution problems at Laurel Mountain
and to apply for a NPDES permit.36 These matters are currently before the Water Resources Board pending appeals by Mr. Frazee and
the companies.37
The parties have raised several issues on appeal including: whether
or not DEP has the duty to pay for the treatment of acid mine drainage in light of the court's decision in Laurel Mountain and whether or
not the companies are "persons" covered under the West Virginia Act.
Inter-State Lumber Company has raised an issue as to whether or not

35. DEP's decision to take enforcement action in the F&M matter should be juxtaposed with the different regulatory climate prevalent under the auspices of the Division of
Energy (DEP's predecessor coal environmental regulatory agency) when the State stepped in
and assumed all liability for the treatment of acid mine drainage at the former Upshur
County, West Vifginia coal operations of DLM Coal Corporation. See John R. McGhee, Jr.,
Note, Environmental Liabilities Not Bankruptable: A Look at the State of West Virginia's
Agreement with DLM Coal Corp., 90 W. VA. L. REv. 991 (1988).
36. Water Resources Board Record, Office of Water Resources Order Numbers 3284,
3285 and 3286 (Aug. 4, 1992).
37. The Water Resources Board was created pursuant to and as an appellate agency to
review all orders of the Office of Water Resources. See W. VA. CODE § 20-5-1 (1989).
The Water Resources Board also promulgates all regulations regarding the West Virginia
Act, W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1992), and it has the authority to review'and
issue permits that have been denied by the Chief of the Office of Water Resources. Director, W. Va. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Gwinn, 408 S.E.2d 21 (W. Va. 1991); 4-H
Comm. Ass'n. v. Division of Water Resources, 355 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1987).
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the surface owner of the property may be held liable for acid mine
drainage resulting from the-severed mineral estate. At the time they
filed the appeals, the three parties also moved for a stay of the Chief's
orders. The Water Resources Board entered an interlocutory order
denying the request for a stay.38
Initially, a hearing was scheduled before the Water Resources
Board for December 14-16, 1992. That hearing was continued by joint
motion of the parties upon the grounds that another civil action,
Haggerty v. Frazee,39 could resolve the issues before the Water Resources Board. Subsequently, DEP elected to proceed solely against the
Cat Run Coal Company and a hearing was conducted on April 22-23,
1993. 40
A prehearing motion to dismiss and brief was filed by Cat Run
Coal Company arguing that, since DEP revoked the permits and forfeited the reclamation bonds, the West Virginia Surface Mine Act
controlled and therefore DEP not Cat Run Coal Company had the

38. See Water Resources Board Record, Oct. 2, 1992, Board's Ruling on Requests to
Grant suspension of Chief's Orders. Even though the request for a stay was denied, the
State did not enforce its order against any of the parties and a de facto stay remained in
place. Interview with Robert G. McLusky, counsel for Cat Run Coal Company (Dec. 29,
1992).
).This
39. Civil Action No. 91-C-245 (Cir. Ct. Preston, County, W. Va. filed .
action was filed by several private citizens against F&M's insurance companies seeking
money from the insurance companies to pay for water pollution treatment at the Laurel
Mountain site. See Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va.
1992). The Charleston Gazette reported that the Haggerty case had been settled for $4
million. CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan 28, 1993, at 1. DEP Director David Callaghan was
quoted as stating that he would still pursue Cat Run Coal Co. for "additional financial
contributions because the settlement is still short of what will be required over the long
term." Id.
40. Prior to the hearing, Cat Run Coal Company filed an injunction action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, challenging the
ability of DEP to require Cat Run Coal Company to obtain a NPDES permit. Cat Run
Coal Company v. David C. Callaghan, No. 93-0044-E (N.D. W. Va.). Cat Run Coal Company argued in federal court that it was entitled to enjoin the State Water Resources Board
hearing on the basis of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. 1991), preempting state law. The district court denied the injunction concluding that Cat Run Coal Company could advance its preemption argument with
the Water Resources Board. Interview with Robert G. McLusky, counsel for Cat Run Coal
Company (Apr. 29, 1993).
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primary obligation to remediate the acid mine drainage problems. Cat
Run Coal Company found support for this argument in the Supreme
Court's Laurel Mountain decision wherein the court had ordered DEP
to begin immediate reclamation of the acid mine drainage." The matter is currently pending before the Water Resources Board and it is
not possible at this time to predict the ultimate outcome of the case.
Based upon the State's recent civil enforcement actions against
Rayle Coal Company and Cat Run Coal Company, coal operators and
purchasers of coal property need to be attentive to water pollution
issues. Even if a company should run afoul of the West Virginia Act,
the company still has room to negotiate with DEP to achieve some
form of settlement that allows the company to comply with the law
and remain profitable. However, if DEP and the company are not able
to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the problem, then the enforcement matter may be referred by DEP to the United States Attorney's
Office for criminal prosecution. 42 Therefore, if a company is not careful, a civil matter can quickly become a criminal matter, and the company will have a major problem on its hands. 43 Against this overview, we turn to the development of environmental criminal prosecutions in general and a closer examination of prosecution under the
Clean Water Act for knowing violations.

41. Cat Run Coal Company also argued in its motion to dismiss that, when a coal
mine is owned by one person but another person has been contracted to mine the property,
then the operator, not the owner, has the duty to obtain the NPDES permit under 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.21(b). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 33295 (May 19, 1980) (discussing that regulation
and the obligations of owners-and operators when the two are not the same).
42. As previously discussed, the West Virginia Act and the Clean Water Act closely
mirror each other. See supra note 27. Therefore, an illegal discharge without a permit in
violation of the West Virginia Act will also be a violation of the federal act. This overlapping set of laws allows the United States Attorney's Office to step in on a state referral
and proseclute the defendant under the Clean Water Act.
43. Based on the author's personal experience, there is nothing 'vorse than negotiations
with the state breaking down in a civil enforcement matter and then at subsequently receiving a phone call from a client advising that the FBI has shown up with a warrant to investigate the same matter. At that point, any hope of resolving the matter with the state is
moot as the United States Attorney's Office has taken over the case.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 7

706

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

IlI.

A.

[Vol. 95:691

CRJMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER

ACT

The Emergence of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions

Between 1972 and 1983 the government prosecuted very few
criminal cases under the Clean Water Act or any other environmental
statute. In those cases where the government criminally prosecuted a
party, the fine was relatively minimum." In 1981, the EPA reorganized its departments and established the Office of Criminal Enforcement.45 Since that time, criminal enforcement of all environmental
statutes has risen dramatically. 46 With the EPA's creation of the Office of Criminal Enforcement and the general political climate supporting environmental prosecution, 47 the Department of Justice has increased its prosecution of environmental crimes.

44. For a criticism of the prior infrequent utilization of criminal prosecutions and the
history of lenient sentencing, see Barbara H. Doerr, Comment, Prosecuting Corporate Polluters: The Sparing Use of Criminal Sanctions, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 659 (1985); Michele

Kuruc, Comment, Putting Polluters in Jail. The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 93, 102-04
(1985).
45. The historical development of EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement has been
exhaustively chronicled by many commentators. See, e.g., Joseph B. Block, Environmental
Criminal Enforcement in the 1990's, 3 VmL. ENvTL. L.J. 33 (1992); Wilson W. Starr, Tur-

bulent 7imes at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and
the Work that Remains, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 900 (1991); Robert W. Adler & Charles
Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 781 (1991); Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LoY, L.A. L. REv. 1133 (1986).
46. 'Between FY 1983 and FY 1991 there were 571 individuals and 267 corporations
indicted for environmental crimes. Not including the cases pending, there were 409 individuals and 204 corporations convicted or guilty pleas with a conviction rate of 80%. Block,
supra, note 45, at 34 (quoting Memorandum from Peggy Hutchin, paralegal, to Neil S.
Cartusciello, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section, United States Department of Justice (Oct.
24, 1991)). More than $74.5 million in criminal fines and penalties have been imposed and
more than 173 years of imprisonment have been imposed. Not surprisingly, there are relatively few criminal prosecutions under the Clean Water Act that result in a published opinion. Attached at Appendix A is a listing of reported and unreported criminal prosecutions
under the Clean Water Act.
47. MeMurry & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1158 n.152 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bulletin (1984))'. The public ranked environmental crimes as
more severe than armed robbery and heroin smuggling. Id
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As Adler and Lord discuss,4 the recent criminal prosecutions of
Exxon, for the Valdez oil spill in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and of John
Pozsgai, for filling in wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act,
both have served to heighten the media and public interest in prosecution of environmental crimes. The Exxon Valdez criminal prosecution
has been recently chronicled in great detail.4 9 A review of that criminal prosecution reveals that the government achieved a number of
precedents in that case, including:
1) Payment by Exxon of a record criminal fine of $125 Million ($25
Million in federal fines, and $100 million in criminal restitution to be split
between the state and federal government);
2) The government proceeded on agency and enterprise liability theories to

prosecute Exxon Corporation, the parent of subsidiary Exxon Shipping
Company, which actually operated the Valdez;
3) The government chose to prosecute under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and
1319(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act, which pertain to the discharge of pollutants from a point source rather than 33 U.S.C. § 1321 of the Clean
Water Act which pertains to oil spills; and,

4) The government effectively utilized the Criminal Fines Improvements
Act of 1987, (CFIA) 18 U.S.C. § 3571, to obtain much higher criminal
fines and penalties than it heretofore would have been able to impose.'

Certainly, neither Exxon nor Exxon Shipping intended for the Valdez
to run aground and spill 10.8 million gallons of oil. This criminal

48. Adler & Lord, supra note 45, at 781-86.
49. Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon
Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147 (1992). Raucher notes that Exxon
Shipping Company and Exxon Corporation were each indicted on five counts for violations

of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988), the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
401-467n (1988), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-703-711 (1988 & Supp.
1991), the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232a (1988 & Supp.
1991), and the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988). IAL at 148 & n.3. Exxon
Shipping Company pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of the Clean Water Act, the
Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Exxon plead guilty to a violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. I&
50. As Raucher points out, the maximum fine that could have been imposed against
Exxon and Exxon Shipping prior to CFIA would have been $128,000 each. CFIA allows
the court to impose a fine up to twice the amount of the gross loss suffered by a person
other than the defendant. IaM at 177-78.
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prosecution, as will be discussed in more detail in part IlH.C, illustrates
the fact that, historically, the imposition of criminal liability under the
Clean Water Act has amounted to virtually strict liability for any negligent discharge into a navigable water.
Another environmental criminal prosecution that has drawn its
share of public interest is the case of John Pozsgai 1 The federal district court convicted Mr. Pozsgai on forty counts of violating the Clean
Water Act for filling in a wetlands area without a permit. The court
sentenced him to a three year term of imprisonment, a concurrent term
of twenty-seven months imprisonment, a five year term of probation, a
one year term of supervised release, and a $200,000 fine. The court
also ordered Pozsgai to comply with a restoration plan for the wetland
site. The third circuit upheld the conviction on appeal, and the district
court rejected the defendant's motion for Reduction of Sentence and
Fine.
On appeal of the Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Fine, the
Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's
decision not to reduce the sentence or fine. The court concluded that a
hearing concerning the defendant's ability to pay the fine should have
been held under the sentencing guidelines. 2 In 1992, three years after
the conviction, the district court determined that the defendant was
unable to pay the fine and it reduced the defendant's fine to $5,000.
On its face, Mr. Pozsgai's criminal prosecution was a routine
53
prosecution for filling in a wetlands area without a proper permit.
The Washington Legal Foundation however seized upon the case as an
example of "enforcement overkill" as it argued that Mr. Pozsgai was
merely "[p]lacing topsoil, earth, and similar clean fill on five acres of
his own property which the government determined technically consti-

51. United States v. Pozsgai, No. Cr. 88-00450 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd mem., 897 F.2d
524 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990), sentence reduction denied, 751 F. Supp.
21 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 938 (3rd Cir. 1991), fine reduced, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20772 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
52. See infra note 58.
53. For similar prosecutions for filling in wetlands areas without a permit, see United
States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 217 (1992); United States
v,.
Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1989).
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tuted a wetland."5 4 As one would expect, the government argued that
Mr. Pozsgai's case was a routine one, but it insisted that a severe
sanction was warranted because Mr. Pozsgai was a flagrant and stubborn criminal violator of the Clean Water Act.55 The most significant
aspect of Mr. Pozsgai's case at the time of his sentencing were the
lengthy sentence of three years and the large fine of $200,000.56
The Exxon Valdez and Pozsgai cases illustrate at a national level
the new emphasis on the imposition of criminal liability for environmental offenses. Prior to 1981, the government was less likely to seek
criminal prosecutions against a company or its agents for violation of
environmental statutes, and, if the govenmnent was inclined to prosecute anyone under an environmental statute, the courts were not likely
to impose severe sanctions for that conduct. 7 The current regulatory
climate amounts to a one hundred and eighty degree turnabout. Today,
the government is all too willing to prosecute any company or individual for a criminal violation of an environmental statute and if convicted, that entity is assured that a court will impose the maximum
penalty allowed under the sentencing guidelines.5 8 That trend now
confronts the coal industry and other owners of coal property that may
have potential water pollution problems under the Clean Water Act.

54.

Adler & Lord, supra note 45, at 784-85 (citing Kamenar, Environmental Protec-

tion or Enforcement Overkill, ENVTL. F., May/June 1990, at 29-30).
55.

Id. at 785 (quoting Thompson, A New Cost of Business for Environmental Vio-

lators, ENVTL. F., May/June 1990, at 33).
56. United States v. Pozsgai, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20772, 20772 (E.D. Pa. 1992). An

even higher fine of $1 million was imposed on Mr. Paul Jones, a property owner, who pled
guilty to negligently violating the Clean Water Act as a result of wetlands being filled in
on his property without a permit. United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 464 n.1 (1992).
57. See supra note 44.
58. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMIsSION (1991). Block observes that prior to the sentencing guidelines a defendant received

only a seven day jail term for filling in a wetlands area and after the guidelines a defendant was ordered to serve three years for the same offense. Block, supra note 45, at 40;

see also Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing
Guidelines: The Time Has Come... and It is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,096 (1990) (computing sentences under the sentencing guidelines to point out the
disparity in fines and sentences for sentences rendered before and after to the effective date
of the guidelines).
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B. Criminal Prosecutions under the Clean Water Act
1.

Overview of Criminal Provisions

Under section 309(c) of the Clean Water Act, four categories of
criminal violations and penalties have been enacted by Congress:
1) Negligent violations - Fines of $2,500 to $25,000 per day and/or
imprisonment up to one year for first offense, with the penalties doubled
for the second offense;
2)

Knowing violations - Fines of $5,000 to $50,000 per day and/or im-

prisonment for not more then three years, with the penalties doubled for
the second offense;
3)

Knowing endangerment - Fines of not more then $250,000 and/or

imprisonment for not more then 15 years for an individual and a fine of
not more then $1,000,000 for an organization with the penalties doubled
for a second offense; and,
4)

False Statements - Fines of not more then $10,000 and/or imprison-

ment for not more then two years with double the penalty for the second
offense 9

To these provisions are added the enhanced penalties under the Criminal Fines Improvement Act (CFIA), 18 U.S.C. § 3571, including the
draconian provision under subsection (e) which allows an alternate fine
of up to double the gain or loss. One other consequence of a conviction under section 309(c) arises under section 508, 33 U.S.C. §
1368(a). This allows the EPA to suspend or debar a company from
receiving federal contracts. 60

59. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(o) (1988).
60. EPA is increasing its use of this enforcement mechanism by seeking suspension
and debarment from government contracts, loans, or grants under the Federal Acquisition
Regulations and Executive Order No. 12,689, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,134 (1989). See also James
M. Stork, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Prioritiesfor the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 916, 934 (1991); Block, supra note 45, at 38-39 (discussing of the debarment of
Valmont Industries, Inc. for a "bad corporate attitude" after a conviction for false reporting
under the Clean Water Act); see also EPA Policy Regarding the Rule of Corporate Attitude,
Policies, Practices, and Procedures, in Determining Whether to Remove a Facility from the
EPA List of Violating Facilities Following a Criminal Conviction, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,785
(1991).
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The foregoing discussion sets forth the illegal conduct and fines
established by Congress under the Clean Water Act. As will be discussed in more detail in part IV, Mr. Law's conviction was for a
"knowing" discharge without a permit, in violation of the Clean Water
Act, and, therefore, the discussion in this section of the Article will
focus on that type of criminal prosecution.6 1 Scott and Bryant set
forth in their article the elements necessary to prosecute a defendant
for a knowing discharge without a permit, in violation of the Clean
Water Act, as follows:
1)

knowingly

2)

discharge

3)

a pollutant

4)

from a point source

5)

into a navigable water of the United States

6)

without a NPDES permit.6 2

Elements two through six are the terms of art defined under the Clean
Water Act and previously discussed above in part II.A, and are not addressed further herein, leaving only the term "knowingly" to be considered at this point.6 3
Without citing to a single decision under the Clean Water Act,
Scott and Bryant state that despite the use of the term "knowing," it

61.

Criminal prosecutions under the "knowing" provision of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(c)(2)

(Supp. 1991), may also be brought for discharges in violation of the NPDES permit requirements, violation of pre-treatment requirements, violations of the aquaculture requirements,
disposal of sewage sludge, and oil spills prohibited under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988).
62.

Scott & Bryant, supra note 1, at 672. This same elemental analysis of the crimi-

nal prosecution was also set forth in their brief filed with the court of appeals in Mr.
Law's case and adopted by the court. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 25; Law,
979 F.2d at 978.
63. It should be noted that Scott & Bryant's elemental analysis fails to mention prosecutions for "negligent" violations of the Clean Water Act which still may be prosecuted
under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991). Examples of prosecutions for negligent
violations would include the criminal prosecutions of Exxon for the Valdez oil spill, discussed in Raucher, supra note 49, and Ashland Oil Company for the oil spill resulting from
the 1988 collapse of its storage tank, United States v. Ashland Oil Co., 705 F. Supp. 270
(W.D. Pa. 1989).
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was Congress' intent that this violation under the Clean Water Act be
construed as only requiring a "general intent standard." Therefore:
The United States does not have to prove that a defendant had a specific
intent to violate the CWA. It is sufficient to prove only that a defendant
knew that he was discharging some noninnocuous effluent, regardless of
whether or not that defendant was aware of the proscriptions of the
CWA.6

Other commentators also have suggested that the government has an
easy burden in proving a defendant's knowing violation under the
Clean Water Act and other environmental laws. 65 However, Scott and
Bryant and the other commentators have not analyzed carefully the
term knowing under the Clean Water Act in the context of its legislative history and the most recent case law defining that term with regard to other environmental statutes. The next two sections will analyze these two areas with regard to the Clean Water Act in an attempt
to shed additional light on what the government must prove in order
to obtain a conviction for a knowing discharge without a permit in
violation of the Clean Water Act.
2.

Legislative History of the Clean Water Act

To determine what Congress intended when it established a criminal violation for a "knowing" discharge in violation of the Clean Water Act, section 309(c)(2),6 an examination of the legislative history
of that enactment is helpful. Congress did not establish the concept of
a "knowing" violation until the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water
Act, at which time the "willful or negligent" violation of the Clean

64. Scott & Bryant, note 1, at 672 n.56. In support of this position, Scott & Bryant
cite to United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307
(1991) and United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
For the reasons discussed in part M.B.3, these cases do not support this position with regard to the standard of proof required under the Clean Water Act.
65. See, e.g., Block, supra note 45, at 42-43 (stating that the government's burden of
proof is easier to meet for 'environmental crimes because they are public welfare offenses
and general intent offenses).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988).
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Water Act was modified to provide for separate negligent and knowing
violations. 67 The legislative history of the Clean Water Act provides
some evidence of what Congress intended in 1987 when it added the
provision for a knowing violation, although it does not clearly state
what was meant by the creation of a knowing offense.6" With regard
to that provision, the House Committee Report provides the following
interpretive discussion:
Presently the Federal Water Pollution Control Act has no provision
that deals with knowing violations of major statutory or regulatory require-

ments. Section 22 is intended to be used primarily to address intentional
violations of the Act occurring on a regular basis over an extended period

ofi time that result in significant harm to public health or the environment.
The section is intended to provide for imposition of severe penalties for

such actions.'
Therefore, from the House of Representatives perspective, the knowing
violation was enacted to punish "intentional" conduct that "regularly"
occurred for an "extended period of time" and that resulted in "significant harm to public health or the environment." This House of
Representatives Report indicates that Congress intended some proof of
mens rea or intent to be shown by the government in order for the
government to prosecute a defendant for a knowing violation of the
Clean Water Act.
The Senate Committee Report illustrates why Congress felt it was
necessary to increase the criminal penalties for a knowing violation:
The felony level penalties for knowing violations (not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000 per day violation and imprisonment for up to three
years) are more closely comparable to the levels provided by the 1984

67. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub.L. 100-4, Title m, Section 312 (codified as 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
68. No Committee reports were prepared by the House or Senate to accompany the
Water Quality Act of 1987, and therefore reference must be made to the House, Senate,
and Conference Committee Reports prepared for the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1985,
S. B. 1128, during the previous session of Congress. S. REP. No. 99-50, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-189, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. CONF. REP. No.
99-1004, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
69. H.R. REP. No. 99-189 at 31.
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amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act RCRA and reflect the commensurately serious nature of the violations to be criminally prosecuted
under the Clean Water Act. Currently, a knowing discharge onto the
ground of hazardous wastes could subject discharger to felony sanctions
under RCRA. However, the same discharge into a sewer system or a
POTW might subject the discharger to the lesser misdemeanor provisions
of the Clean Water Act. The result is an intentional incentive to dump
hazardous substances into sewer systems or POTW's. The addition of these
criminal sanctions will aid in protecting these sewer systems and POTW's.
Substantial Federal monies are invested in many of these POTW's. Existing misdemeanor penalties are retained
to address those negligent violations
70
which merit lesser punishment.

This Senate Committee Report helps to explain the higher penalties
added under the 1987 amendments, but it does not shed any light on
the intent of Congress regarding the standard of proof. The Conference
Committee Report adds nothing further to the explanation of the meaning of the term knowing, although it does state that similar language
in the Senate and House Bills was merged in codifying this provi71
sion.
In considering the meaning of the term "knowing" in section
309(c)(2), of the Clean Water Act, an examination of the "knowing
endangerment" provisions that Congress also added in the 1987
amendments at section 309(c)(3), of the Clean Water Act is helpful."2
Such an examination of the section pertaining to "knowing endanger-

70. S. REP. No. 99-50 at 29.

71. H.R. CONF. REP. No. at 138.
72. This section provides as follows:
Any person who knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 1317,
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by the Administrator or by a State, or in a permit issued under section 1344
of this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a'State, and who knows at the
time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than
$250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A person which is
an organization shall, upon conviction of violating this subparagraph, be subject to
a fine of not more than $1,000,000. If a conviction of a person is for a violation
committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both fine and imprisonment.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 1991).
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ment" indicates that Congress was more precise in defining what
knowledge an individual must possess in order for the government to
prove a violation of that section, as compared to the mere use of the
word knowing in the section pertaining to knowing violations.' In
particular, Congress specified that, to prosecute an individual under the
knowing endangerment section, the individual must "know at the time
that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury." In determining what a person knew, Congress
added the following parameters:
[Mn determining whether a defendant who is an individual knew his conduct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injuryI) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief
that he possessed; and
II) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not
by the defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant;
except that in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge,
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant
took affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information.74

This more specific definition of knowledge has made it more difficult
for the government to convict a defendant for a "knowing endanger-

73. Senate Report 99-50 sets forth the following explanation of the "knowing endangerment" provision:
This section also adds to section 309(c) enhanced felony penalties for certain
life-threatening conduct. The concept of a knowing endangerment crime is found,
as well, in section 3008(e) of RCRA. This new offense under the Clean Water
Act is based upon violation of certain predicates in the Act. In the event of such
knowing violation, the amendment subjects to greater punishment one who knows
that he thereby placed another person in imminent danger 6f death or serious
bodily injury. The criminal penalties that apply upon conviction (up to 15 years
imprisonment plus fine of up to $250,000 for individuals, a fine of up to
$1,000,000 for organizations) are equivalent to the RCRA knowing endangerment
provision, as recently amended.
S. REP. No. 99-50 at 29.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i) (1988). An analysis of the language in this provision
also reveals an intent by Congress to incorporate the concepts of "responsible corporate
officer" and "willful blindness" that have developed under similar environmental enactments,
discussed further in part fII.B.5 of this Article.
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ment" violation.75 Unfortunately, Congress did not specify why the
language regarding the "knowing endangerment" section is more precise than the language regarding the knowing violation under the Clean
Water Act.
The legislative history of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act pertaining to the knowing violation, provides some guidance
from the House of Representatives Report to conclude that Congress
intended the government to introduce some evidence to prove that the
defendant intentionally violated the Clean Water Act. Congress did not
express, however, to what degree the government must prove that the
defendant intentionally violated the Clean Water Act and whether or
not the government must prove that the defendant knew that his conduct violated the Clean Water Act in order to obtain a conviction.
To further examine this issue, the next four sections will analyze
case law pertaining to the definition of the term knowledge and three
other doctrines that have developed as substitutes for proof of knowledge. The doctrines of "public welfare offense," "responsible corporate
officer," and corporate vicarious or respondeat superior criminal liability, have all developed in other areas of law, and they are now applied
to environmental criminal prosecutions to either dispense with the

75. In United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), a co-owner of a
laboratory that tested blood samples was criminally prosecuted for placing over one hundred
plastic vials of blood samples, some contaminated with hepatitis B, in a bulkhead where
they were washed out to sea and later washed ashore onto a Staten Island public beach. Id.
at 7. The government's failure to prove that the defendant was aware of the "high probability" that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury or death resulted in the vacation
of the conviction on two counts of "knowing endangerment" under section 309(c)(3). Id. at
13-15. The government argued that "from the evidence regarding the currents and tides the
jury could infer that the defendant knew or should have known that anything thrown into
[the] waters would be swept out into the sea and eventually be lodged on a beach." Id. at
14. The district court rejected this approach concluding that the government's own expert's
had conceded that the danger of a serious bodily injury or death as a result of contact with
the contaminated blood vials was remote. Id.; see also United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d
27 (1st Cir. 1992) (reversing conviction for knowing endangerment under section 309(c)(3)
upon the grounds that Congress did not intend that provision to protect worker safety and it
concluded that the statute would apply only after a discharge into a public water system);
Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Criminalizing Occupational Safety Violations: The Use of "Knowing
Endangerment" Statutes to Punish Employers who Maintain Toxic Working Conditions, 14
HARV. ENVTL. L.J 487 (1990).
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element of knowledge or to inferentially satisfy the element of knowledge. These next sections will analyze the Clean Water Act and the
violation for a knowing discharge without a permit to determine how
this prior case law relates to this offense and the government's standard of proof.
3.

Definition of the Term "Knowledge"

The term "knowledge" is an ambiguous term, and what knowledge
must be proven by the government in order to obtain a criminal conviction under a given statute is an elusive concept that typically will
be dependent upon the court's review of legislative history and its
interpretation of the statute consistent with the case law that has developed concerning the term knowledge. Set forth in the preceding section
is the legislative history of the knowing violation of the Clean Water
Act. This section examines how courts have defined the term knowledge under other statutes to see how that case law may aid an interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
The two seminal decisions that analyze the term knowledge and
reach contrary results are Liparota v. United States76 and United
States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp." Liparota and
International Minerals represent the two opposite conclusions a court
can reach in determining whether or not Congress intended, by its use
of the term knowing in a given statute, for the government to be required to prove that a defendant knew that his conduct violated the
law.
In InternationalMinerals, the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that the government could prosecute a defendant for knowingly transporting a "corrosive liquid," sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid, in violation of the law, by proving that the defendant knew what
he was transporting.7" More significantly, the Court held that the gov-

76. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
77. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (repealed 1979) empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the transportation of "corrosive liquids" and subsection (f) provides criminal
penalties for knowingly violating the Commission's regulations.
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eminent did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct constituted a violation of the law, because, given the fact that
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."79
In Liparota, the Court was called upon to determine what mens
rea or knowledge was required in order to convict a defendant for
knowingly possessing food stamps in violation of the law.8" The
Court considered the statute's legislative history and other precedents
and determined that the government, in order to obtain a conviction,
would have to prove that the defendant knew that he possessed the
food stamps and that he knew that his possession of the food stamps
constituted a violation of the law."' In so holding, the Court declared
that "requiring mens rea is in keeping with our longstanding recognition of the principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."' 8 2 The Court distin79. Liparota, 402 U.S. at 565. At the same time, the Supreme Court recognized that
there "may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if
Congress did not require, as in Murdock, "mens rea" as to each ingredient of the offense."
Ik at 564 (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)).
80. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988).
81. In Liparota, the Supreme Court quoted the following discussion concerning the
difficulty in determining what the word knowledge means in a given statute:
Still further difficulty arises from the ambiguity which frequently exists concerning
what the words or phrases in question modify. What, for instance, does "knowingly" modify in a. sentence from a "blue sky" law criminal statute punishing one
who "knowingly sells a security without a permit" from the securities commission?
To be guilty must the seller of a security without a permit know only that what
he is doing constitutes a sale, or must he also know that he has no permit to sell
the security he sells? As a matter of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it is not
at all clear how far down the sentence the word "knowingly" is intended to travelwhether it modifies "sells," or "sells a security," or "sells a security without a permit."
471 U.S. at 424 n.7 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 27
(1972)).
82. 471 U.S. at 427. It should also be noted that, although the Supreme Court did not
approve the defendant's specific intent instruction, it held that it would be more useful to
instruct the jury with regard to the defendant's mental state required by the statute and
"eschew use of difficult legal concepts like 'specific intent' and 'general intent."' Id at 433
n.16.
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guished International Minerals on the basis that possession of foods
stamps was not the "type of conduct that a reasonable person should
know is subject to stringent public regulation
and may seriously threat83
safety.,
or
health
community's
the
en
In exploring the issue of knowledge in other environmental criminal prosecutions, the courts have examined the statutes to determine
whether to apply the conclusion reached in International Minerals or
Liparota. For instance, the issue of knowledge has been extensively.
litigated under the provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 197684 (RCRA), with varying results. Under one provision
of RCRA which prohibits the knowing treatment, storage, or disposal
of hazardous wastes without a permit,'5 a majority of courts have
observed that there is no legislative history, and that the term knowing
is missing from the beginning of subsection (d)(2)A). Therefore, the
courts have concluded that Congress did not intend the government to
prove that the defendant knew that a permit was required. 6 In so

83. IA.at 433.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that in a
criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the government is only required to
show knowledge of the hazardous waste and not knowledge of the RCRA permit status);
United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that in a
criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the government is required to prove
that the defendant knew what he was doing, what was being stored, what is being stored
may harm others or the environment, and that the defendant has no permit; the government
is not required to prove that the defendant knew that a permit was required); United States
v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that in a criminal prosecution under 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the government was not required to prove the defendants were
aware that violation of RCRA was a crime or that the defendants knew they were handling
hazardous wastes because anyone who possesses or handles hazardous wastes is presumed to
be aware of the regulations), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v. Hoflin,
880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding government not required to prove that the defendant
knew the facility had no permit, rather it was only required to prove that the defendant
knew that chemical wastes had the potential to harm others or the environment), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that in a criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the government is
not required to prove that the defendant knew that a permit was required by law or that
the company did not have a permit). For a further discussion of the knowledge aspects of
the decision in Dee, see Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO. WASH.
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holding, most courts have followed International Minerals and concluded that the government is not required to prove that the defendant
also knew that what he was doing required a permit, because, given
the fact that hazardous substances are involved, the defendant should
have known those substances were subject to regulation.
On the other hand, courts have examined the knowledge issue
under a different provision of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1), which
prohibits the knowing transportation of hazardous waste to a facility
without a pennit. In these instances they have applied a Liparota type
analysis and concluded that use of the term knowing was intended by
Congress to require that, in order to obtain a conviction, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the facility did not have
a permit.' The issue of knowledge, as construed by the Court in
Liparota and International Minerals, has also been considered under
other environmental statutes, and the courts have concluded that the
government was not required to show that the defendant knew his
conduct was against the law in order to obtain a conviction.88

L. REv. 862 (1991). But see United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd
Cir. 1984) (holding that in order to be convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the
government must prove that the defendant knew that a permit was required and that the
facility did not have a permit), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
in criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1), the government is required to prove
that the defendant knew that the facility he transported hazardous waste to had no permit,
but the government was not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was transporting hazardous waste); United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that in criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1), the government is required to
prove that the defendant knew that the facility he transported hazardous waste to had no
permit); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (in criminal
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1), the government is required to prove that the
defendant knew that the facility he transported hazardous waste to had no permit).
88. See, e.g., .United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
criminal prosecution under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1988), for
knowingly violating regulations, does not require the government to prove the defendants
knowledge of the law in order to obtain a conviction); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d
425 (3rd. Cir. 1986) (holding that criminal prosecution under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(b) for knowingly selling migratory birds, does not require the government to prove scienter or mens rea), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987).
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To date, no court has extensively examined the term knowledge
under International Minerals or Liparota to determine whether or not
the government must prove that a defendant knowingly violated each
element of section 309(c). In particular, courts have not considered
whether the government must prove that the defendant knew that his
discharge was in violation of the Clean Water Act and that he was
required to obtain a NPDES permit. Courts also have not decided
whether or not it would be a defense for the defendant to show that
he was not aware that he was discharging through a point source or
that he was discharging into a navigable waterway. Likewise, no court
has determined if a "general intent standard" or a "specific intent
standard" of proof applies to the government.
In United States v. Ellen,89 the Fourth Circuit discussed the element of knowledge in cursory fashion in footnote two with the following observation:
We also reject Ellen's separate argument that the district court failed
to instruct the jury that an element of the offense was that Ellen knew that
a permit was required by the CWA. The district court instructed the jury
that absence of a permit was an element of the offense, and it unambigu-

ously stated that the United States had to prove that Ellen acted knowingly
with regard to each element.'

Based upon this language, the Fourth Circuit has held that, in order
for the government to obtain a conviction for knowingly violating
section 309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act, it must prove that the defendant knowingly violated each element of the offense, including proof
that the defendant knew that a permit was required. Whether or not
this means that the government will have to prove that the defendant
also knew that his conduct violated the Clean Water Act, remains to
be developed in future cases. 91
89. 961 F.2d 462. ICHECK}

90. Id at 466. More recently, in an unpublished per curiam decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also upheld a conviction for knowing violation of section 309(2) of the Clean Water Act and held that extensive discussion of the
"scienter element .. , is unnecessary." United States v. Schallom, No. 92-5157, 1993 WL

137002, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 1993). The court also concluded that the defendant's proffered motive instruction was unnecessary. Id
91. If the government is required to prove that the defendant knowingly violated each
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Courts should be encouraged to carefully examine the issue of
knowledge under section 309(c)(2) and to conclude that the government is required to prove that the defendant knowingly violated each
element, including proof that the defendant knew that a permit was
required. In considering whether the analysis in Liparota or International Minerals should apply, courts should be encouraged to apply
Liparota and conclude that Congress intended, by the use of the term
knowing, to require the government to prove that a defendant knew
that a permit was required and fhat the defendant knew that his conduct violated the Clean Water Act.
InternationalMinerals may clearly be distinguished in those cases
where the discharge or other activity in violation of the Clean Water
Act is relatively innocuous conduct, that is, not the type of conduct a
reasonable person would recognize as subject to regulation, such as
allowing excessive sedimentation to fill up a stream, or placing dirt
and other earthen material in a wetland without a permit. In the context of coal mining, many polluted discharges result not from any
overt conduct on the part of the operator, but as a result of rain water
coming into contact with coal refuse or gob piles and the gravity discharge of pollutants into the stream. Arguments can certainly be made
that this type of conduct is not so "dangerous or deleterious," as those
terms are used in International Minerals, to suggest to the average
person that his conduct is subject to regulation and criminal penalties.
In arguing that a knowing violation of the Clean Water Act requires the government to prove that the defendant knew that he violated each element of the offense and that his conduct violated the law,
it may be expected that the government will argue that their burden of
proof with regard to the knowledge element is reduced because the

element of the knowing violation under the Clean Water Act, then it would appear to be
inconsistent to also allow the government to have the jury instructed that the government
does not have to prove that the defendant knew that he was violating the law. As discussed
in part IV of this Article with regard to the knowledge jury instruction given in Law, this
latter instruction seems inconsistent with the government's burden of proof and misleading
to the jury. Other prosecutions for knowingly violating the Clean Water Act have not addressed this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(conviction for two counts of knowingly discharging without a permit in violation of the
Clean Water Act was upheld without a discussion of knowing).
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Clean Water Act is a "public welfare offense." The next section of
this Article will examine that doctrine and delineate why that doctrine
has no continuing applicability in a criminal prosecution for a knowing
violation of the Clean Water Act.
4.

Public Welfare Offenses

The concept of "public welfare offenses" emerged at common law
as a result of various legislative enactments that did not contain an
element of knowledge, intent, or mens rea in order for the government
to criminally prosecute a defendant. 2 For example, in United States
v. Dotterweich,93 and United States v. Park,94 the Supreme Court
considered criminal prosecutions under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act!5 and concluded that Congress had enacted a statute
that did not require "knowledge or intent" in order to prosecute an
individual for violations of that Act.96 The Court sanctioned this approach because "the burden of acting at hazard [is placed] upon a
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a
public danger." 97 Other courts have recognized that these decisions
allow criminal liability without proof of knowledge or intent and therefore they amount to the legislative imposition of strict liability.98
Originally, the Clean Water Act was broadly construed in the
criminal context as a "public welfare offense". This development may
be attributed in part to the broad reading the United States Supreme
Court gave the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,9' in United States v.
92. For an overview of the development of "public welfare offenses" in the United
States, see Morissettee v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952). For a more current
discussion, see Raucher, supra note 49, at 165-67 and Robert D. Fluharty & Robert E.
Lannan, Criminal Liability for Environmental Law Violations by Coal Operators, 93 W. VA.
L. RsV. 599, 619, 623 (1991).
93. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
94. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
95. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988 & Supp. 1991)
96. Park, 421 U.S. at 670.
97. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277.
98. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald "& Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 5152 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1019 (1987).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988) [hereinafter Refuse Act]. The permitting program under
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Standard Oil Co.,1' ° a criminal prosecution for the accidental discharge of aviation gasoline. In Standard Oil, the Court held that Congress had enacted the Refuse Act to'remedy water pollution problems,
and, therefore, the Refuse Act should be construed consistent with
"common sense, precedent, and legislative history."10 1 This liberal
reading of the Refuse Act was further expounded upon by the First°2
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. White Fuel Corp.,
wherein the court recognized that the Refuse Act was commonly referred to as a strict liability statute because the government was not
required to prove mens rea or scienter to obtain a conviction. The
court held that the government could obtain a conviction under the
Refuse Act by proving "actual non-compliance" rather than proving an
intent to violate the statute or a lack of due care.103
The rule that "public welfare offenses" are to be construed broadly
to effectuate Congressional purloses was immediately applied in some
of the first criminal prosecutions for "willful or negligent" violations
under the Clean Water Act' °4 to rebut defense arguments that the
Clean Water Act as a penal statute should be strictly and narrowly
construed.0" Courts, relying upon the "public welfare offense" doctrine, held that the government did not need to prove that a defendant
specifically intended to violate the Clean Water Act in order to obtain
a conviction for a willful or negligent violation of the Clean Water
Act.1°6 Those cases decided under the "willful or negligent" violation
the Refuse Act was one of the precursors to the Clean Water Act. For a review of the
Refuse Act's provisions and criminal enforcement history, see Michael K. Glenn, The Crime
of "Pollution": The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REy. 835 (1973).
100. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
101. Id. at 255.
102. 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974).
103. Id.at 623.
104. For a thorough review of the "willfully and negligent" standard, see Truxtun Hare,
Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers For Negligent
Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 935 (1990).
105. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). Courts have continued to recognize that the
Clean Water Act and its penal provisions should be construed "in a broad, rather than a
narrow fashion." United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1991).
106. The willful standard was examined by the court of appeals in United States v.
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of the Clean Water Act bordered on the imposition of strict liability,
as little or no proof of a defendant's knowledge was required in order
for the government to obtain a conviction.
The prior case law that discusses the "public welfare offense"
doctrine for willful or negligent violations of the Clean Water Act has
no applicability to criminal prosecutions today for knowing violations
under section 309(c)(2) because the government has a higher burden of
proof under the amended Clean Water Act. The legislative history
surrounding the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, and recent
case law concerning the "public welfare offense" doctrine indicate that
the government has a burden of proof to establish that the defendant
acted intentionally and knowingly. Therefore, the public welfare offense has no continuing applicability.
With regard to the legislative history, the House Committee Report
indicates that Congress intended the government to prosecute defendants for knowing violations under the Clean Water Act only when the
defendants intended their conduct. Thus, by implication, the government is required to prove that the defendants knew that their conduct
was in violation of the law.107 Support for disregarding the "public
welfare offense" doctrine for knowing violations of the Clean Water
Act can also be found in criminal prosecutions under more recent
environmental enactments, such as United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co., °8 discussed in greater detail in part III.C.2,
and United States v. Borowski.' °9 In MacDonald & Watson, the First

Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980),
where the court of appeals held that the evidence obtained by the government in its sampies of the discharge was substantial evidence for the jury to infer that a "willful act precipitated them." More particularly the court of appeals held:
The Government did not have to present evidence of someone turning on a valve
or diverting wastes in order to establish a willful violation of the Act.
602 F.2d at 1129. With regard to the negligent violations of the Clean Water Act, the court
of appeals held that the government's evidence that certain discharges were caused by the
inadequate capacity of the holding tank was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the
holding tanks "were negligently maintained by the Frezzos and were insufficient to prevent
discharges of the wastes." Id
107. See H.R. REP. 99-189, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 31 (1985).
108. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
109. 977 F.2d 27 (lst Cir. 1992).
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Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a company president, prosecuted as a responsible corporate officer, for the knowing
transportation of hazardous waste to a facility without a permit in
violation of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1). The appellate court held
that the district court had improperly instructed the jury that knowledge of the illegal acts could be inferred based upon the president's
-osition within the company. In so holding, the court expressly rejected the government's arguments that the "public welfare offense" doctrine could be utilized to negate the express knowledge requirements of
RCRA:
While Douerweich and Park thus reflect what is now clear and wellestablished law in respect to public welfare statutes and regulations lacking
an express knowledge or other scienter requirement, we know of no precedent for failing to give effect to a knowledge requirement that Congress
has expressly included in a criminal statute. Park , 421 U.S. at 674, 95
S.Ct. at 1912. Especially is that so where, as here, the crime is a felony
carrying, possible imprisonment of five years and, for a second offense,
ten.110

In MacDonald & Watson, the court concluded that the government
must establish by direct or circumstantial proof that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the transportation of hazardous waste on the dates
charged in the indictment."'
In Borowski, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a
conviction for "knowing endangerment" under the section 309(c)(3) of
the Clean Water Act. The court concluded that, even though the defendant knowingly violated section 3071" as a result of discharges in
violation of the pretreatment standards, and knew that he was placing
his employees in imminent danger of bodily injury as a result of their
coming into contact with dangerous chemical solutions poured into

110. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 51-52.
111. The issue in MacDonald & Watson was the jury instruction pertaining to the
defendant's knowledge of illegal acts. The court of appeals indicated, without analyzing the
issue, that the district court had instructed the jury that the government was also required to
prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the facility did not have a permit. Ia at- 47-48.

112. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988).
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sinks, the Clean Water Act was not intended by Congress to regulate
worker safety. Therefore, "a knowing endangerment prosecution cannot
be premised upon danger that occurs before the pollutant reaches a
publicly-owned sewer or treatment works."'1 3 The court of appeals
specifically rejected any reliance by the government upon the "public
welfare offense" doctrine to justify the defendant's prosecution for
knowing endangerment:
The fact that this case involves pollution does not make the rule of
lenity inapplicable. This is not a case like United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225, 86 S.Ct. 1427, 16 L.Ed.2d 492 (1966), where
"common sense, precedent, and legislative history" all argued for a result
favorable to the Government. LikeWise, the principle that "[p]ublic welfare
statutes... are not to be construed narrowly but rather to effectuate the
regulatory purpose," United States v. McDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,
933 F.2d 35, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1991), does not help the Government here,
given the Clean Water Act's regulatory purpose."'

The appellate court's analysis and rejection of the "public welfare

offense" doctrine in MacDonald & Watson turned upon the
government's jury instruction, which did not require the government to
prove that the defendant knew that his company was transporting hazardous wastes in violation of the law. The court of appeals in
Borowski, on the other hand, rejected the application of the "public
welfare offense" doctrine based upon the scope of the "knowing endangerment" provisions of the Clean Water Act. That decision did not
relate to the intent or state of mind of the defendant.
One may argue that the court of appeals' renunciation of the
"public welfare offense" doctrine in MacDonald & Watson and
Borowski applies with equal force to criminal prosecutions for "knowing" discharges without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act.
Courts should reject any suggestion by the government that it should
be able to rely upon that doctrine and dispense with proof that a defendant was aware of the specific discharges and the other elements of
the offense and that conduct was in violation of the Clean Water Act.

113. Borowski, 977 F.2d at 32.
114. I at 32 n.9.
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Since Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 to provide for a
"knowing" discharge in violation of the Clean Water Act under section
309(c)(2), which is separate and distinct from the negligent violation
set forth in Section 309(c)(1), Congress must have intended for the
"knowing" discharge violation to be prosecuted only when the government is able to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
alleged violation and the law.'
5.

Responsible Corporate Officers

The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine is utilized by the
government in environmental criminal prosecutions to impute the
knowledge of company employees to company officials who arguably
knew or should have known about the alleged polluting event."'
115. It may be expected that the government will rely upon the contents of S. REP.
No. 99-50, supra note 68, at 29, to argue that the Clean Water Act continues to be governed by the "public welfare offense" doctrine because the statute serves to protect public
health and as such it should be construed in a broad fashion to place only a minimal burden of proof on the government to show that the defendant knew that he committed the
illegal act and the government should not be required to prove that the defendant also specifically knew that he was violating the law.
The government has some support for this position as the "public welfare offense"
doctrine was used in the context of a pre-1987 amendments criminal prosecution for the
"knowingly" filing of materially false statements with the EPA (prior to the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, this section was codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), and it
is now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (1988)). In United States v. Ouelette, 11 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350 (E.D. Ark. 1977), the district court relied upon the "public welfare
offense" doctrine and concluded that, while the government had a duty to prove knowledge
on the part of the defendant, it did not have a duty to prove that the defendant acted with
the specific intent to violate the Clean Water Act. AL at 1352. The district court concluded
that:
Mhe government will have to prove that the defendant knowingly (i.e., voluntarily
and intentionally) made the false statement, but it will not have to prove that the
defendant, in so doing, knowingly violated the law or purposely intended to violate
the law.
I. The Ouelette court also cited with approval the definition of knowing from § 14.04 of
Edward J. Devitt & Charles B. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil and
Criminal (3d ed. 1977). Id It may be anticipated that the government will continue to
argue that this type of jury instruction that does not require the government to prove that
the defendant knew that he was violating the law is sufficient in a prosecution for "knowing" violations of the Clean Water Act.
116. Sixty-eight percent of all federal prosecutions for environmental crimes are against
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This doctrine developed simultaneously with the "public welfare offense" doctrine in criminal prosecutions under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act n1 7 in United States v. Dotterweich"' and United
States v. Park.119 Pursuant to this doctrine, corporate officers were
held liable for their "responsible share" of the illegal conduct even if
the officer did not participate in, or have any knowledge of, the illegal
conduct. 120
Under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine a corporate
officer or other management employee may be held criminally liable
upon proof that the defendant was a corporate officer with responsibility to supervise the alleged illegal activities and knew or believed "that
the illegal activity of the type alleged occurred."12 1 The government

individuals, as opposed to corporations. Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. DeMonaco, The
Present Use of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement iof
Environmental Laws, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,145 n.8. (1993).
117. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988).
118. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
119. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
120. For a thorough discussion of the development of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine and its application to environmental criminal prosecutions, see Hare, supra note
104, at 967-73; Fluharty & Larman, supra note 92, at 619-28; Alan Zarky, The Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 983 (Jan. 9, 1991).
121. This definition of the responsible corporate officer doctrine was paraphrased from
a jury instruction by the court of appeals in MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 52. In
United States v. Dee, the following jury instruction was given:
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining the defendant's knowledge are their positions in the organization, including their responsibilities under
the regulations and under any applicable policies. Thus, you may, but need not,
infer that a defendant knew facts which you find that they should have known
given their positions in the organization, their relationship to other employees, or
any applicable policies or regulation. Again, this is only one factor which you may
consider in determining whether the government has established, knowledge beyond
a reasonable doubt . . . . You should consider the defendant's behavior in light of
all the circumstances and instructions which I am giving you in determining
whether the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants acted knowingly.
Barrett & Clarke, supra note 86, at 885 (quoting Joint Appendix to Brief of the Appellee
at 1154, United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990)). The district court further
instructed the jury that, as managers within the munitions directorate, defendants may be
found guilty of counts one, two, three, or four if you find that the government has proved
each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
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has used this doctrine to prosecute company officials who had no actual knowledge of the illegal conduct, but who arguably should have
known about the illegal activity by virtue of their position within the
conpany.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was applied in a pre1987 amendments "willful or negligent" criminal prosecution under the
Clean Water Act in United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.,122 wherein
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, without extensive discussion, held
that the jury had been properly instructed on the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine. More recently, in United States v. Brittain,123 the
Tenth Circuit followed Frezzo Bros. and concluded that the government had established by sufficient evidence that the defendant willfully
or negligently caused an unpermitted discharge in violation of the
Clean Water Act and, therefore, his prosecution was not based merely
on his status as the director of the city public utility.124 In Brittain,
the court also discussed the fact that section 309(c)(3) of the Clean

First, that each defendant has a responsible relationship to the violation. That
is, that it occurred under his area of authority and supervisory responsibility.
That each defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the violation.
That each defendant acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect or correct the
violation. And I have told you what you can consider on the question of knowingly.
Barrett & Clarke, supra note 86, at 885. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has suggested, in dicta, that "those individuals who hold the requisite responsible
positions with the corporate defendant" could be prosecuted for a knowing violation of
RCRA. United States v. Johnson & Towers, 'Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984). While
some courts have relied upon this dicta, at least one commentator has suggested that such
reliance is misplaced. See Zarky, supra note 120, at 990-91. In that same article Mr. Zarky
also criticized the above referred jury instruction on the responsible corporate officer doctrine in Dee because the "knowingly failed to detect" language does not comport with the
knowing requirements in the statute and may amount to a simple negligence standard. Id.
122. 602 F.2d at 1128 n.11. The text of the instruction regarding the responsible corporate officer doctrine in Frezzo Bros. is reprinted in Hartman & DeMonaco, supra note 116,
at 10,145 n.51.
123. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991). Brittain is also a pre-1987 amendments "willful
or negligent" criminal prosecution under the Clean Water Act.
124. In Brittain, the court of appeals also rejected the defendant's argument that a
person other than the permit holder could not be criminally prosecuted under the Clean
Water Act. Id at 1418-19.
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Water Act specifically added to the meaning of the term "person"
under that section "any responsible corporate officer."'"
Approximately two weeks after the decision in Brittain, the First
Circuit distinguished Frezzo Bros. in United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co., 126 and concluded that the government could
not utilize the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine to establish a
company president's liability for a knowing transportation violation of
RCRA.127 The court of appeals concluded: "In a crime having
knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge.' ' 28 The court held that a
company official's position alone could not serve as the basis for a
conviction of a "knowing" violation, but that position along with other
circumstantial evidence, such as knowledge of illegal acts on prior
occasions or willful blindness
to the facts,' 29 "may be sufficient to
' 30
establish knowledge.'

125. Section 309(c)(3) states, "For the purpose of this subsection, the term person
means . . . any responsible corporate officer." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1988).
126. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1988). This provision makes it illegal to knowingly transport or cause to be transported hazardous wastes to a facility without a permit.
128. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
129. The court of appeals recited the district court's jury instruction on willful blindness as follows:
In determining whether a Defendant acted knowingly, you also may consider
whether the Defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have
been obvious. If so, the element of knowledge may be satisfied because a Defendant cannot avoid responsibility by purposefully avoiding learning the truth. However, mere negligence or mistake in not learning the facts is not sufficient to
satisfy the element of knowledge.
Id at 52 n.15. The court of appeals also cited to other criminal cases where the courts
have recognized that deliberate ignorance or conscious avoidance of the facts would establish the element of knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243 n.2
(1st Cir.) (evidence of conscious avoidance is merely circumstantial evidence of knowledge),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir.)
(deliberate ignorance instruction given in mail fraud case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956
(1980).
130. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55. Barrett & Clarke state that jury instructions on knowledge, responsible corporate officer, and willful blindness were given in Dee
which was decided before MacDonald & Watson. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 86, at 88188. They argue that the jury instructions were consistent with the requirements that the
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Independent of the court of appeals' decision in MacDonald &
Watson, the district court in United States v. White,13 1 examined the
responsible corporate officer doctrine with regard to the criminal prosecution of a company official under RCRA for illegal storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes and knowing endangerment.132 It concluded that the government could not rely upon that
doctrine because the government was required to establish the
defendant's knowledge. In White, the government relied upon
Dotterweich and Park in arguing that it could prove that the defendant
was in violation of RCRA, even if he had no knowledge of the conduct alleged. The district court rejected this argument by holding
This court must recognize that the statutes involved in Park and
Dotterweich require no mental state or action .... The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine would allow a conviction without showing the requisite specific intent. None of the cases cited by the government supports
the theory that a conviction may be had under a state of mind requirement
other than that specified by Congress. In the instant case
it is "knowing,"
133

not "should have known" as the prosecution suggests.

Based upon MacDonald & Watson and White, a corporate official
in future criminal prosecutions for a knowing discharge without a
permit in violation of the Clean Water Act should have a defense

when that official has no actual knowledge of the illegal discharge and
the government prosecution is proceeding solely upon the basis of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine. To establish criminal liability for
a knowing violation of the Clean Water Act, the government must
prove, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the official had
"actual knowledge" of the illegal acts in order to prevail in the criminal prosecution. Any continued reliance by the government upon the
responsible corporate officer doctrine alone is misplaced in view of the
company officials had to knowingly violate RCRA, and the district court's jury instructions
did not substitute a negligence standard. The court of appeals in Dee did not discuss in its
decision the issue of knowledge or the responsible corporate officer doctrine as the court
summarily concluded in a footnote that the jury instructions were all proper. United States
v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 746 n.8 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
131. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash 1991).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2)(A) & (e)(1988).
133. White, 766 F. Supp. at 895.
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legislative history to the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act and
the recent case law interpreting that doctrine in the context of knowing
134
violations under other environmental enactments.
6.

Corporate Vicarious or Respondeat Superior Liability

The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine is utilized by the
government to prosecute corporate officials for the illegal actions of
other company employees by virtue of their official position. The government has another arrow that it can aim at companies should it
desire to prosecute a company for the actions of company agents. In
the case of Mr. Law and MMI, the government pursued criminal liability against MML under a theory of "vicarious corporate liability. ' 135 In other cases, this same doctrine has been referred to as "respondeat superior" criminal liability. 13 6 Under both theories, the result

is the same, the government seeks to impute criminal liability to the
137
corporation as a result of a company agent's unlawful conduct.

134. Hartman & DeMonaco argue that the responsible corporate officer doctrine merely
defines what persons may be liable under the Clean Water Act and other environmental
statutes and that the doctrine was never intended to obviate the government's duty to prove
a corporate officer's knowledge of the offense. Hartman & DeMonaco, supra note 116, at
10,145.
135. Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 3. The government stated that it prosecuted
MMi for "acts and failures to act" on the part of Mr. Law, and the company was prosecuted as a result of Mr. Law's actions. AL n.3. The government rejected the defendant's argument that Mr. Law was prosecuted under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine. From
a review of the record in the case, the government's argument is born out, as it appears
that a "vicarious corporate liability" jury instruction was given but no jury instruction was
given with regard to the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine in Law.
136. Cincotta, 689 F.2d at 238. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978). Somewhat related to this doctrine is the agency or enterprise
liability theory utilized by the government to prosecute Exxon for the conduct of its agent,
its wholly owned subsidiary Exxon Shipping. See Raucher, supra note 49, at 150-57.
137. In Law, the following jury instruction was given with regard to the vicarious
corporate liability of MMI for the actions of Mr. Law:
A corporation may be held criminally liable for unlawful acts committed by
its agents, officers or employees. A corporation is legally bound by acts and omissions of its agents that are: (1) done or made within the scope of the agent's employment or agency relationship with the corporation; and (2) within the agent's
apparent authority to act on behalf of the corporation; and (3) if the act or omission is committed on behalf of or to the benefit of the corporation.
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MMI did not challenge on appeal the validity of the "vicarious
corporate liability" jury instruction. The government proffered the
"vicarious corporate liability" jury instruction based upon well established case law in the Fourth Circuit and other circuits."' Similar
jury instructions have been utilized by the government in other environmental criminal prosecutions. 139 Under the "vicarious corporate

Therefore, in order for you to find defendant, Mine Management, Inc., guilty
of any count of the indictment in this case, the United States must prove, with
respect to that particular count, each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
FIRST-That the United States has proven each of the essential elements of the
specific count, as previously explained to you, as to defendant Lewis Law;
SECOND-That, with respect to that specific count, defendant Law was an agent,
officer, or employee of defendant Mine Management, Inc.; THIRD-That, with
respect to that specific count, Law's acts or omissions were committed within the
scope of his authority or apparent authority to act on behalf of Mine Management,
Inc.; and FOURTH-With respect to that specific count, defendant Law was acting
for the benefit of the corporation.
If you find that the United States has failed to prove any one of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to any count, then you must find defendant, Mine Management, Inc. not guilty of that particular count.
(Tr. Vol VI. 157-59).
138. The government in Law cited to the following cases as support for the vicarious
corporate liability jury instruction when it was offered in district court: United States v.
Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (false documents,
conviction of corporation); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572-73 (4th
Cir.) (Sherman Act, anti-trust convictions) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983);
United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984) (medicare fraud, conviction of
corporation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741
F.2d 730, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (bid rigging and mail fraud, conviction of corporation);
United States v.Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 (8th Cir. 1983) (false statements, conviction of corporation).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that a corporation could be criminally liable for the conduct of its supervisors who acted
intentionally or with plain indifference to the law in a prosecution for mail fraud and RICO
resulting from the illegal operation of a landfill and transportation of medical waste), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3029 (1992); Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. at 6 (affirming a
conviction against the city sewer committee on.five counts of "knowingly" filing a materially false statement in violation of section 309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act since the knowledge of its agent may be imputed to the committee); United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1992) (reversing the company's conviction because it may have been affected by the improper conviction of the company's agent, which
it also reversed, and refusing to decide if the actions of clerical employees were sufficient
to impose criminal liability on the corporation). But see United States v. LBS Bank-New
York, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (refusing to grant motion for acquittal for
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liability" theory, to obtain a criminal conviction against a corporation,
the government must prove two elements: 1) that the company agents
were acting within the scope of their employment or with apparent
authority; and, 2) that the company agents were acting for the benefit
of the company."4
With regard to the first element, "scope of employment" has been
defined as those acts which a company agent has been assigned or are
within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority.' 4 ' The
fact that the company agent's acts were unlawful or contrary to company policy is not a defense." However, it may be a defense to a
criminal prosecution of a corporation under the "vicarious corporate
liability" theory that the agent was a low level functionary and, therefore, his criminal conduct should not be imputed to the company.' 43
The second element requires the government to prove that the
company agent was acting on behalf of the company, but this element
does not require that the government actually prove that the company
in fact benefitted from the illegal conduct of the company agent'44
In at least one case, a corporation was able to defend itself in a criminal prosecution for knowingly violating the Connally Hot Oil Act 45
on the basis that the company agents committed illegal acts that were
46
not intended to benefit the company.

bank convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government even though employee who's con-

duct led to the indictment was acquitted).
140. Automated Medical Lab., 770 F.2d at 406.
141. Id.at 407.
142. I
143. See Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. at 6 (stating, in dicta, that the court
would have trouble with imputed criminal liability to a business on the basis of a low
echelon employee). But see United States v. Hanger One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1977) (rejecting district court decision that conduct of low level employee may not be used
to impute criminal liability to the company).
144. See Automated Medical Lab., 770 F.2d at 407. Note also that the court of appeals
in Automated Medical Lab. recognized that a company agent's conduct could inure to his
own benefit even though it also benefits the company. The government does not have to

prove that the company agent was acting exclusively to benefit the company. IL at 407;
see also United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 823 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1217 (1985).
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-7151 (1988).
146. See Standard Oil Company v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); see
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As will be discussed in part VI of this Article, one of the ways a
company can minimize its criminal liability for environmental offenses
is to perform an environmental audit and establish an environmental
compliance program. Utilization of these types of programs may help
define the scope of employment for company employees and establish
protocols within the company for the handling of potential environmental violations. Establishment of this type of program may help a company minimize its criminal exposure under the corporate vicarious or
respondeat superior liability doctrine and therefore avoid the dire consequences suffered by Mr. Law and MMI as a result of their noncompliance with the Clean Water Act. The next section of the Article
turns to an examination of that prosecution for a knowing discharge
without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act.
IV.

UNITED STATES V. LAW

On November 15, 1991, Mr. Lewis R. Law and MMI were found
guilty on sixteen counts of violating the Clean Water Act. 147 Mr.
Law was personally sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and
fined $80,000 ($5,000 per count). Defendant MMI was also fined
$80,000.148 Mr. Law and MMI both appealed their convictions to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit raising three
issues: the district court improperly instructed the jury that the source
of the water pollution was immaterial; the government failed to prove
an essential element in the case, that is, that the water pollution emanated from the gob pile; and the district court erred in its evidentiary
rulings that denied the defendants an opportunity to introduce evidence
of New River Company's practice of concealing environmental problems from prospective purchasers. The court of appeals considered the
first and second issues as one issue in summary fashion, and devoted
one paragraph to the third argument in a per curiam opinion upholding

also United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977), interpreted in, Kuruc, supra
note 44, at 107 n.124 (the district court acquitted the corporation because the individual's
conduct did not benefit the corporation).
147. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1844 (1993).
148. It
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the conviction. 149 Scott and Bryant have more than adequately set
forth the facts underlying the convictions of Mr. Law and MMI and
they will not be repeated here.15
In their brief, Mr. Law and MMI relied upon National Wildlife
Federation v. Consumers Power Co.,'51 National Wildlife Federation
v. Gorsuch,152 and Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,153 in support
of their argument that under section 502(12) of the Clean Water Act,
they could be found criminally liable only if the government proved
that they had added a substance to the waters which resulted in a
discharge of pollutants into the creeks. 54 In support of this assertion,
Mr. Law and MMI argued that: the New River Company, not MI,
created the gob pile, the ponds, and the water pollution discharges at
the site; the New River Company concealed the discharges from Mr.
Law at the time of sale; and, based upon real property law, the New
River Company still owned the gob pile, and therefore, the New River
Company, not MMI, was liable for the water pollution discharges. 55
Alternatively, Mr. Law and MMI argued that the water pollution discharging into the creeks did not emanate from the gob pile on the
Summerlee property. Rather, it resulted from a discharge of water from

149. IA
150. See Scott & Bryant, supra note 1, at 673-77.
151. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
152. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
154. Brief of Appellants at 23-31, United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
155. Mr. Law and MMI introduced evidence to show that New River Company, a
subsidiary company of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, had operated several mines,
a coal preparation plant, and rail siding on the Summerlee property since the 1930s. J.A.,
supra note 8, at 57, 214. As a part of the operations, New River created a seventy acre
refuse or gob pile, which rose to a height of one hundred feet in some parts. IM at 57, 6566, 212, 255. New River Company concealed the water treatment problem from Mr. Law at
the time of purchase based on company policy at the time and the fact that the treatment
ponds were not illustrated on a map. Id, at 256-57, 84-87. Mr. Law specifically denied that
New River Company or anyone with the State ever advised him about the water treatment
problems prior to his purchase of the property. Id at 328-33. With regard to the real property issue, Mr. Law and MMI offered jury instruction number 15 which would have instructed the jury that even if the gob pile was the source of the pollutants, the defendants
would not be liable because the defendants only owned the surface of the property. Brief of
Appellants, supra note 154, at 32.
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mining in the Eagle coal seam, a known acid producing seam, on
adjacent property that flowed under the gob piles, through the ponds
on this property and into the creeks.15 6 The defense in this case may.
be summarized as "finger pointing", that is, the defendants were not
responsible for the problem, someone else was responsible. 157 it
should be noted that Mr. Law and MMI, in their appellate brief, conceded that the discharge of water from the. ponds was polluted within
the definitions of the Clean Water Act, and, therefore, they did not
government's evidence that the discharge required
attempt to rebut the
51
permit.
a NPDES
Finally Mr. Law and MMI argued that the district court erred in
several evidentiary rulings including its refusal to allow cross-exanmnation of Mr. Briguglio, New River Company's Director of Engineering,
and direct testimony of Don Reedy, a former employee of New River
Company, concerning New River Company's practice of concealing
environmental problems at various sites when the company attempted
to sell those properties 9 Mr. Law and MMI argued that the government spent "considerable time and effort trying to prove what defendant knew in 1980" and, therefore, they should be allowed to rebut

156. Mr. Law had two expert witnesses, George Hall, Ph. D., a geo-technical engineer,
and John James, another geo-technical engineer, who both studied the gob pile on the
Summerlee property and offered testimony that the acid mine drainage discharging into Wolf
and Arbuckle Creeks was not resulting from the gob pile on the Summerlee property; rather
it resulted from a discharge of water from mining in the Eagle coal seam on adjacent property that flowed under the gob piles and into the creeks. J.A., supra note 8, at 275-86,
289-90. Based upon this testimony, the defendants offered instructions numbers 9A, 10, and
11 which would have instructed the jury that in order to be liable, the jury had to find that
the defendants generated the pollutants in the water. II at 491-93. These instructions were
all refused by the district court.
157. This defense is not entirely without merit. The State of West Virginia and the
town of Fayetteville currently have four consolidated civil actions pending in the Circuit
Court of Fayette County against Mr. Law and MMI, as well as against Mr Law's predecessor in title, the New River Company, now known as the Mountain Laurel Resources
Company and its parent company, Cox Minerals, Inc. Town of Fayetteville v. Mine Management, Inc., Nos. 93-C-323-H, 91-C-194, 88-C-261, 84-C-162 (Cir. Ct. Fayette County, W.
Va.). The plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of law, parties in addition to Mr. Law and MMI
are liable for the acid mine drainage properties at the site. ld
158. Brief of Appellants, supra note 154, at 11.
159. Brief of Appellants, supra note 154, at 36-37.
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that testimony through evidence of New River Company's policy of
concealment.
To counter the defendants' arguments on appeal, the government
argued that the evidence presented at trial supported the fact that NMI
owned the surface of the property which included the ponds that discharged into the creeks, and, therefore, the ownership of the gob pile
at the Summerlee site was irrelevant." o The government further distinguished Consumers Power Co., Gorsuch, and Train by arguing that
unlike those cases, where courts properly concluded that no pollutant
had been added to the water, in the defendants' case it was indisputable that pollutants had been added to the water and the water treatment system consisting of settlement ponds, pumps, and a mechanism
to dispense soda ash, was specifically designed to treat the water for
this pollution. 161 The government also defended the district court's
decision to instruct the jury that the source of the water pollution was
not a defense because there was clearly an illegal point source, discharge of pollutants into the creeks that occurred from the ponds on
162
the defendants' property.
The government countered the defendants' expert testirony concerning the origination of the pond's polluted discharge through its

160. Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 39-41. In its statement of facts, the government did set forth the testimony of New River Company's Mr. Briguglio that the deed
included the conveyance of the gob pile, as the major purpose of the transaction was to
convey the gob pile to MMI so that Mr. Law could reprocess the coal in the gob pile. I
at 11-12.
161. Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 27-39. The government also argued that to
accept the defendants' generator argument could lead to absurd results such as the conclusion that a sewage treatment plant would not need a NPDES permit because it was merely
discharging polluted water generated by others. Iad at 28.
162. The district court instructed the jury regarding the source of the water pollutants
as follows:
If you so find, you are further instructed that it is not a defense to the
charge that the water discharged from the point source came from some other
place or places before its discharge from the point source. It is not a defense to
this action that some or all of the pollutants discharged from a point source originated at places not on the defendants' property. This is so because the offense
consists of the knowing discharge of a pollutant from a point source into a water
of the United States.
J.A., supra note 8, at 490.
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own expert, John Michalovic, a chemist with Calspan Corporation in
Buffalo, New York, who studied the refuse pile under contract with
the United States Department of Interior, Office of Surface Mining.
Mr. Michalovic testified that it was his conclusion that the gob pile
did produce acid mine drainage with high levels of iron and
manganese.1 63 Based upon this expert testimony, the government argued that the gob pile on the property, and not some foreign source,
caused the polluted discharge from the ponds on the property.
To dispel the defendants' arguments that Mr. Law was not aware
of the discharges at the site, the government went to great lengths at
the trial to prove that Mr. Law was indeed aware of the water pollution discharges at the time he acquired the property in April, 1980,
and at subsequent times thereafter. 164 The government's evidence of
Mr. Law's kmowledge may be summarized as follows:
1) Mr. Law, through Mine Management, Inc. leased the Summerlee proper-

ty from New River Company in 1977 to collect coal fines from slurry
ponds, and, therefore, he was aware of the water treatment problems at the
site prior to his purchase of the property;
2) In April, 1980 Mine Management, Inc. purchased the Summerlee property constituting 241 acres of surface, including a gob pile, on Wolf Creek,
from New River Company;
3) While New River Company owned the property it had a NPDES permit
and it pumped water from one pond on Wolf Creek to another pond on
Arbuckle Creek, treated the water/acid mine drainage with soda ash and
then discharged the water into Arbuckle Creek;
4) Louis Briguglio, the former Director of Engineering with New River
Company, testified at trial that he warned Mr. Law prior to Mine Management, Inc. purchasing the property that there was severe acid mine drainage problems at the site and that the company paid $5,000.00 per week to
treat the discharge. He further testified that Mr. Law was aware of the
water treatment problems and that Mr. Law had advised him that he believed that he could find a lower costing method of treatment;

163. Id. at 190-92. Mr. Michalovic's study was unrelated to the defendants' criminal
prosecution as it was published in 1983. Ia His conclusions were based upon samples taken
from seeps in the gob pile and a laboratory test that he developed to replicate the leaching
conditions of the gob pile. Id at 202-210.
164. This testimony was summarized in the government's statement of facts. Brief of
Appellee, supra note 28, at 3-23.
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5) DNR officials testified that they advised Mr. Law that the Summerlee

property had severe water problems on the site immediately after he purchased the property. Mr. Law met with inspectors on the site, and he
stated that he would get an operator on the site who would get a NPDES

permit;
6) Several operators on the property for the next few years applied for and
obtained NPDES permits. In 1984, the State requested that Mine Management, Inc. include its name with the operator on the application for a
NPDES permit. Mine Management, Inc. declined this invitation;
7) After 1984, no NPDES permit was ever obtained for the Summerlee
property and the State took a number of civil and criminal enforcement
measures: a consent order was entered into; it obtained criminal warrants
in magistrate court; it applied for an injunction; and, it filed an action
seeking daily fines."

Based upon this overwhelming testimony, the government argued
that Mr. Law was aware of the discharges from the ponds on MIA's

property. It argued this testimony had been properly admitted concerning the defendants' knowledge and the jury had been properly instructed concerning the defendants' liability for those "knowing" discharges.
Finally, the government argued that the evidentiary rulings, holding as
irrelevant the cross-examination of Mr. Briguglio and the direct testimony of Mr. Don Reedy concerning New River Company's alleged
policy of concealing environmental problems, were proper under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and it argued that these rulings should not
serve as a basis for a reversal.'6

With regard to the first and second issues raised in the defendants'
appeal, the source of the pollutants and whether or not they emanated
from the gob pile, the court of appeals agreed with the defendants that
the source of the pollution may be relevant and that "the trial court's
jury instructions did not state the law with strict accuracy."' 167 However, the court went on to conclude that the error was harmless because the "proper focus is upon the discharge from the ponds into

165. J.A., supra note 8, at 69-71, 72-73, 111-19, 127-29, 183-85, 297, 303, 311-12,

502-09, 514, 528-30, 535.
166. Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 41-43.
167. Law, 979 F.2d at 979.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

51

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:691

Wolf and Arbuckle Creeks." 168 The court specifically rejected the

defendants' arguments that only the generator of the pollutants may be
held criminally liable under the Clean Water Act because the defendants had on their property a "water treatment system [that] collected
runoff and 169leachate subject to an NPDES permit under the
CWA ....
Since the court of appeals decided as a matter of law that Mr.
Law and MMI were required to obtain a NPDES permit for their point
source discharges into Arbuckle and Wolf Creeks, it ultimately concluded that the "origin of pollutants in the treatment and collection
ponds is therefore irrelevant." 170 Finally, the court concluded that the
defendants' arguments that they should have been allowed to introduce
evidence to show the New River Company's policy of concealing environmental pollution from prospective purchasers was irrelevant because
"the relevant mens rea issue was Law's knowledge as of March, 1987,
that the ponds were discharging pollutants into the creeks without, or
in violation of, a NPDES permit." l" l Without so stating, the court
obviously concluded that the government had met its burden of proof
to establish knowledge in this.case.
It is not surprising that the court upheld the convictions of Mr.
Law and MMI, given the fact that the defendants' brief conceded that
a point source discharge of acid mine drainage occurred at the
Summerlee property, and given the government's clear evidence that
the defendants knew of the discharges as alleged in the indictment.
The court of appeal's statement that "the relevant mens rea issue was
Law's knowledge as of March, 1987 . . . " reflects on the knowledge

issue discussed above in part lII.B.3. of this Article. However, the
issue of the defendants' knowledge was not raised or resolved in Law.
The court's mens rea statement in Law, coupled with the decision in
United States v. Ellen,172 indicates that the Fourth Circuit recognizes

168.
169.
170.
171.

IM.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 980. This holding is consistent with the knowledge instruction given by the

district court.
172. 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/7

52

Arceneaux: Potential Criminal Liability in the Coal Fields under the Clean W

1993]

CWA PROSECUTIONS-A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

that a "knowing" discharge in violation of section 309(c)(2) requires
some mens rea or proof that the defendant knew that the discharge
was done without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act.
In this case, the district court's jury instruction concerning knowledge addressed the issue as follows:
For the purpose of the Clean Water Act, all the Government must
prove is that the defendants knew the general character and nature of the
materials they were discharging. The Government does not have to prove

that the defendants knew the'legal status of the materials or the status of
the receiving waters. The Government does not have to prove that the
defendants knew that they were violating the law.
Further, to satisfy the element of the offense that the defendant acted
knowingly, all that the United States must prove is that the defendant
knew at the times of the discharges alleged in the indictment is that he
was doing so without a permit. You are instructed that the defendants'
knowledge of discharges at the time the property was purchased is simply
not relevant. 73

The district court instructed the jury that the government was required
to prove the defendants knew that the discharges were done without
permits, but it also instructed the jury that the government did not
have "to prove that the defendants knew that they were violating the
law." In light of the foregoing discussion of the knowledge component
of the Clean Water Act in part III.B.3., it may be questioned whether
this jury instruction is internally inconsistent, or at a minimum would
be improper, as it may confuse the jury since the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly violated each element of the offense. Furthermore, if the analysis under Liparota applies to criminal
prosecutions for knowing discharges in violation of the Clean Water
Act, then this portion of the instruction would appear to be erroneous.
Unfortunately, the issue was not raised at trial or on appeal and, therefore, the court of appeals was not called upon to consider that issue. It
will remain for future cases to definitively resolve the government's
burden of proof in this regard.

173.

J.A., supra note 8, at 490.
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Also problematic in the decision is the issue of the source of the
pollutants. The court of appeals was troubled by the jury instruction
concerning -the source of the pollutants offered in Mr. Law's case, but
it ultimately concluded the error was harmless in this case. 174 This
issue has the potential to repeat itself under myriad factual patterns
and pose many legal problems for coal operators and owners of coal
property in the future. For instance, imagine that an abandoned underground mine bursts open and acid mine drainage is released across two
tracts of land onto a third tract where the polluted water discharges
into a creek? Within a matter of days the water forms a channel in the
ground and an illegal point source discharge exists. Would the State
begin civil or criminal enforcement actions against the owner of the
third tract of property who owns the point source discharge but who
has no control or ownership of the abandoned coal mine? Would it
make a difference if the owner of the third tract was an out of state
corporation that owned thousands of acres within West Virginia and
had no knowledge of the unexpected discharge on its property? Could
the United States Attorney's Office indict and convict the owner of the
property under this scenario?
Under the jury instructions given in the case of Mr. Law and
MMI, the law would appear to be that the owner of the third tract
could be indicted and convicted under the above referred hypothetical,
given the irrelevance of the source of pollutants. Such an anomalous
result defies common sense, however, and one would hope that the
state and federal governments would not prosecute an innocent owner
of property under this type of factual circumstance.17 5
This hypothetical also serves to illustrate the oversimplification of
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Law as indicated in Scott and Bryant's

174. The jury instruction on the irrelevance of the origin of pollutants is set forth
supra note 162.
175. The author raised this question with Mr. Bryant of the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of West Virginia and he advised that similar questions were
raised by the panel when Mr. Law's case was argued before the court of appeals. Mr.
Bryant responded that while a criminal prosecution was possible under the Clean Water Act,
such a criminal prosecution was doubtful given prosecutorial discretion. Interview with S.
Benjamin Bryant, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of West Virginia (July
1992).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/7

54

Arceneaux: Potential Criminal Liability in the Coal Fields under the Clean W

1993]

CWA PROSECUTIONS-A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

article. In the coal industry, with regard to an individual coal mining
operation, it is not uncommon to have a variety of competing legal
interests regarding the ownership and control of a given tract of land.
In many cases, the mineral and surface estates have been severed, the
owner of the mineral interest has leased or subcontracted to an operator the right to mine the property, and the surface owner may have
leased or contracted with a party to timber the land. Who is liable for
a surface discharge without a permit resulting from an underground
coal mining operation when there are four companies that have some
legal interest and control regarding the property? In the Preston County
case regarding F&M, the State apparently decided to follow a simplified understanding of Law and initially attempted to order all parties
that had some control over the surface to remediate the water pollution.
In Law, it was fortuitous for the government that MMI was the
surface owner of the property, and arguably, the water pollution was
generated as a result of water leaching through the gob pile on the
surface of the property. The underlying facts of the case made for a
simple criminal prosecution. In Scott and Bryant's article, the authors
recognize that the surface and mineral estate may have been severed
and suggest that an underground operator can be prosecuted along with
the surface owner as an aider and abettor.'76 To the extent that the
United States Attorney's Office attempts to enforce the criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act against innocent parties who have no
knowledge or control over the discharges, it may be predicted that
they will be met with numerous objections that the Clean Water Act
was not intended by Congress to prosecute such innocent property
owners.
Finally, one defense that may have been available to Mr. Law and
MMI that was not asserted by the defendants was whether or not the
Abandoned Mine Lands (AML) program under SMCRA 177 negated

176. See Scott & Bryant, supra note 1, at 679-80 (24-25).
177. The Abandoned Mine Lands program (hereinafter AML) was enacted as a part of
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (1988 & Supp. 1991), to finance the restoration and
clean-up of abandoned coal mine sites. Under the AML program, coal operators are required
to pay per ton reclamation fees. 30 U.S.C. § 1232 (1988). The monies are administered
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any of the defendant's liabilities under the Clean Water Act. The AML
program was designed to reclaim inactive coal mining operations when
there is no "continuing reclamation responsibility under state or other
federal laws. ' 178 Prior to the trial of Mr. Law and MMI, the State
had evaluated the Summerlee site and determined that it was eligible
for AML funds because no one had operated on the property since
New River Coal Company in 1978.179 Pursuant to that determination,
the State requested $4.2 Million from the Office of Surface Mining to
remediate the Summerlee site. After the conviction of Mr. Law and
MMI, the Office of Surface Mining requested the State to address the
convictions and whether or not they had any bearing on the
Summerlee site's eligibility for AML monies. By letter dated August
4, 1992, the West Virginia Attorney General's Office stated that the
criminal convictions did not alter their opinion that the site was eligible for AML monies because: "Inasmuch as there is no continuing reclamation responsibility under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
I am still of the opinion that funds from the State AML program may
be utilized to reclaim the refuse pile near Summerlee."' 0 By letter
dated August 16, 1992, the Office of Surface Mining approved inclusion of the Summerlee site in West Virginia's Eleventh AML Construction Grant and allocated $4.2 Million for remediation of the site.
On the one hand, the United States Attorney's Office prosecuted
Mr. Law and MMI for water pollution at the Summerlee site, claiming

through the Secretary of Interior, Office of Surface Mining, and distributed to the states
through a grant program. 30 U.S.C. § 1235 (1988). Pursuant to the AML program, monies
are only available to reclaim property on those sites where there is no "continuing reclamation responsibility under State or other Federal laws." 30 U.S.C. § 1234 (1988).
178. 30 U.S.C. § 1234 (1988).
179. It should be noted that the AML program was originally established to only expend funds to remediate mining operations that had ceased prior to Aug. 3, 1977. Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) amended the AML program effective Oct. 1, 1991 to
allow monies to be expended on sites that became inactive between Aug. 3, 1977 and Jan.
21, 1981. 30 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(4)(B)(i) (1988). Furthermore, the AML program was amended to allow the expenditure of monies to replace water supplies if the adverse effect on the
water supplies was a result of mining operations that occurred predominantly prior to Aug.
3, 1977. 30 U.S.C. § 1233(b)(2) (Supp. 1991).
180. Letter from Joseph A. Lazell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, to Richard
Darnell, Abandoned Mine Lands and Reclamation, West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection (Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with author).
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they were criminally liable for the acid mine drainage. On the other
hand, another branch of the federal government, the Office of Surface
Mining, determined that no one is liable for remediation of the site
and therefore AML funds may be used at that site. Obviously these
positions are inconsistent and perhaps Mr. Law and MMI, had they
been aware of the state and federal governments' position that AML
funds were available to remediate the site, could have defended their
prosecution under the Clean Water Act on the basis that the State had
determined that the site was eligible for AML funds and therefore a
fortiori, the defendants had no liability as alleged in the indictment.
On more than one occasion it has been suggested that Mr. Law
was criminally prosecuted because he did not take his potential liabilities under the Clean Water Act seriously. As will be discussed in part
VI of this Article, a company that takes its environmental liabilities
seriously and attempts to comply in good faith, should not ordinarily
be faced with a criminal indictment under the Clean Water Act or
other environmental statutes. The facts in Law indicate that the defendants had ample opportunity to work with the State and come into
compliance with their obligations under the Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, the defendants did not work with the State and now they are
paying a rather severe price. Before turning to the development of
strategies to minimize criminal liability in the coal fields, the next
section examines a recent decision that could have tremendous impact
on civil liability, and ultimately criminal liability, within the coal
fields.
V. AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS V. EPA

On November 16, 1990, the EPA published its final NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges.' 8' These
storm water regulations arose out of 1987 amendments to the Clean
Water Act that required EPA to promulgate regulations to control
storm water run-off associated with industrial activity.112 The storm

181. 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26).
182. Section 402(p)(4)(A) of the Clean Water Act required EPA to promulgate storm
water discharge regulations before Feb. 4, 1989. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A) (1988). For fur-
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water regulations are very broad in their scope, and, for the first time,
EPA or the equivalent state enforcement agency will have jurisdiction
to regulate water discharges associated with inactive or abandoned coal
183
mining operations.
The coal industry challenged the storm water regulations on several grounds. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld EPA's regulatory decision to include active and inactive
coal mines within the definition of industrial activity subject to the
new storm water regulations. 184 The storm water regulations for inactive coal mining operations became effective on October 1, 1992, and
therefore, the decision in American Mining Congress will have an
immediate impact on the regulation of abandoned coal mining operations in West Virginia and other states, and it may be anticipated that
the impact of this decision will be felt in the criminal arena in the
years to come as EPA and the states develop enforcement
strategies."'
For years, environmentalists have complained that the EPA was
not doing enough to regulate water pollution, and more particularly,
acid mine drainage, that was commonly associated with abandoned
coal mining operations.1 16 One of their primary concerns was EPA's
ther discussion of the background of these regulations, see Stephen G. Allen, Special Legal

Problems with other Environmental Laws under SMCRA, 7 J.MIN. L. & PoL'Y 129 (19911992); Thomas C. Reed, Some Recent Developments in the Water Resource Protection Obligations of the Coal Industry: Can Coal and Water Mix?, 12 E. MIN. L. INsT. 13-1 (1991).
183. The regulations will also have some impact on active operations in areas not
currently regulated by SMCRA. For instance, haul roads are currently exempt under the
definition of disturbed area for the collection and treatment of surface water. 30 C.F.R. §
816A6(a)(2)(i) (1992). EPA's new regulatory program may require active operations to collect and treat surface water runoff from haul roads and other areas currently not regulated
under SMCRA.
184. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1992).
185. Dr. Eli Mccoy, Chief of DEP's Water Resources Section was quoted as stating
that the Ninth Circuit's decision in American Mining Congress "could be the most significant development for West Virginia streams in a long time." He also stated that he intended to use the decision "to require permits from owners of old gob piles and poorly reclaimed mines that are creating storm runoff pollution problems." Rich Steelhammer, Opinion May Assist in Cleanup of Streams, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 12, 1992, at 1B, lB.
Finally, Dr. McCoy stated that he did not envision his agency moving against current landowners who had no role in problem-causing mining activity. Id at 5B.
186. See, e.g., Patrick C. McGinley & Thomas Sweet, Acid Coal Mine Drainage: Past
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decision not to regulate point source discharges associated with inactive or abandoned coal mining operations."l 7 The environmentalists
were equally concerned about the lack of regulation of non-point
source discharges associated with inactive or abandoned coal mining
operations, but, prior to 1987, the regulation of non-point source discharges was primarily left to the states. 8 While it is indisputable
that water drainage from abandoned coal mining operations creates
water pollution problems,8 9 it may be questioned whether it is appropriate to expect coal operators and property owners of abandoned
coal mining operations to remediate those sites several decades after
the problems were created. It seems particularly onerous to require
parties to remediate the problems under the threat of civil or criminal
liability. To fully understand this issue, an examination of EPA's storm
water regulations and the Ninth Circuit decision upholding that decision is in order.
EPA's definition of "storm water discharge associated with industrial activity" contains the following critical elements:
1)

both active and inactive mining operations are included;

2) coal mining operations that have had their performance bond released
under SMCRA are excluded;
3) inactive coal mining operations that were reclaimed under SMCRA's
Initial Program Regulations or state regulations are included;
4) inactive coal mining operations are included only if storm water
actually comes into contact with material or waste products associated with
coal mining operations; and,
5) inactive coal mining operations are included only if there is an identifiable owner/operator. 1"
Pollution and Current Regulation, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 67 (1978-79); Michael D. Bryan, Note,

Toward Strict Liability for Abandoned Mine Drainage, 71 KY. LJ. 193 (1982-83); Dorinda
G. Dallmeyer, Note, A New Legislative Approach for the Control of Acid Mine Drainage,
17 GA. L. REv. 969 (1983).

187. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.30, 434.40, 434.50 (1992).
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1988).

189. In Aug. 1989, the Division of Water Resources prepared a Non-point Source Assessment for West Virginia that identified 3,973 abandoned mine land problem areas that
had created problems in 96 watersheds, affecting the water quality in 484 streams. See Scott
& Bryant, supra note 1, at 670 n.41.
190. "Storm water discharge associated with industrial activity" is defined as follows:
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Under this regulation, every active and inactive coal mining site that
has storm water that comes into contact with any overburden, coal,
slag, gob pile, or any other waste products will have to obtain a storm
water permit The only exception will be for those coal mines that
have received bond release under SMCRA or a state equivalent program.
The court of appeals in American Mining Congress, quickly dispensed with the coal industry's objections to EPA's storm water regulations and their effect on inactive or abandoned coal mining operations. The coal industry raised several objections to EPA's storm water
regulations of inactive coal mining operations including: 1) the regulations were inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and its legislative
history; 2) the regulations were inconsistent with SMCRA and the
AML program; 3) the regulations were inconsistent with EPA's past
practice; 4) EPA was arbitrary in failing to exclude coal mining operations under SMCRA's interim regulatory program and pre-SMCRA
state laws; 5) EPA's regulations apply in an illegal retroactive manner;
and, 6) EPA's promulgation of the regulations was improper and
unlawful. 191

Facilities classified as Standard Industrial Classifications 10 through 14 (mineral
industry) including active or inactive mining operations (except for areas of coal
mining operations no longer meeting the definition of a reclamation area under 40
C.F.R. 434.11(1) because the performance bond issued to the facility by the appropriate SMCRA authority has been released, or except for areas of non-coal mining
operations which have been released from applicable State or Federal reclamation
requirements after December 17, 1990) and oil and gas exploration, production,
processing, or treatment operations, or transmission facilities that discharge storm
water contaminated by contact with or that has come into contact with, any overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished products, by-products or waste
products located on the site of such operations; (inactive mining operations are
mining sites that are not being actively mined, but which have an identifiable
owner/operator, inactive mining sites do not include sites where mining claims are
being maintained prior to disturbances associated with the extraction, beneficiation,
or processing of mined materials, nor sites where minimal activities are undertaken
for the sole purpose of maintaining a mining claim).
40 C.P.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (1992).
191. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 764-72 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The court of appeals reviewed the industry's objections based
upon the Clean Water Act's legislative history and found the argument
lacking since nothing expressly indicated that Congress intended inactive coal mining operations to be exempt. 92 Given the lack of legislative history, the court determined that EPA's decision to regulate
inactive coal mining operations was reasonable and consistent with the
Clean Water Act and, therefore, the regulatory action was upheld.
The coal industry also objected to the storm water regulations on
the basis that they were inconsistent with the AML program under
SMCRA.1 93 The court of appeals dispensed with this argument by
stating that the AML program does not require permits, nor does the
AML program regulate discharges from coal mining operations. Therefore, the court saw no inconsistency between the AML program under
SMCRA and EPA's storm water regulatory program and EPA's decision to regulate inactive coal mining operations."
Contrary to the
court's ruling, the AML program and EPA's storm water regulatory
program do seem to be at cross purposes with regard'to inactive coal
mining operations. The AML program was designed to reclaim inactive
coal mining operations when there is no "continuing reclamation responsibility under State or other Federal laws. '" 5 EPA's storm water
regulations establish a new legal responsibility on the part of property
owners or coal operators who own inactive coal mining operations to
take action under the Clean Water Act to eliminate surface run-off.
That liability may be perceived as a liability that precludes eligibility
for AML funds. 96

192. Id. at 765.

193. For a discussion of the AML program, see supra note 177.
194. American Mining Congress, 965 F.2d at 767.
195. 30 U.S.C. § 1234 (1988).
196. As discussed in part IV, the fact that Mr. Law and MMI were held liable under
the Clean Water Act did not preclude the Attorney General's office from issuing its opinion
that there were no continuing reclamation responsibilities at the Summerlee site and therefore the site was declared eligible under the AML program. Mr. Law and MMI were prosecuted in advance of the storm water regulatory program becoming effective. It will remain
to be seen whether this new legal obligation will block some properties from being declared
eligible under the AML program.
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The court of appeals also dismissed the coal industry's argument
that the regulations were invalid because they imposed a retroactive
obligation on coal operators or owners of coal lands. The court concluded that the regulations did not act in a retroactive manner because
they regulate future discharges of contaminated storm water.1" The
court did concede that: "[t]he rule may frustrate the economic expectations of some inactive mine owners, who may need to install treatment
systems or implement storm water management practices in order to
comply with the permit requirements. But regulations are not retroac198
tive merely because they require a change in existing practices."
The court also noted that the regulations "may reduce the financial
attractiveness of mine ownership."' 99 This statement seems a matter
of understatement as it comes too late for an owner or operator of
inactive coal mining operations to divest himself of the property now
that the storm water regulations are in effect.
In West Virginia, DEP has worked with the coal industry to fashion a permit application to register inactive coal mining operations
under the storm water regulations. Many questions now face DEP and
the coal industry as EPA and the State proceed for the first time to
regulate storm water discharges from inactive mining operations. One
of the first practical problems arose as owners of large tracts of land
attempted to file an application for several thousands of acres, and
they were unable to identify with specificity all of the inactive mines
on their property and all storm water discharges. It may be expected
that the regulation of storm water discharges of inactive coal mining
operations will continue to develop in the future.
Inactive mine sites at several locations may be in for major changes, however, because for the first time coal operators and owners of
coal property will have some direct responsibility to develop pollution
prevention plans for storm water that comes into contact with contaminated material. That means every gob pile, abandoned deep mine, and
abandoned surface mine will have to be analyzed to determine the
potential water pollution problems and what corrective action may be
197. American Mining Congress, 965 F.2d at 796.
198. Id. at 770.
199. Ld at 769.
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necessary. As the storm water permit process develops, extensive documentation will have to be submitted to the State along with periodic
water monitoring reports. It may be anticipated that significant sums of
money will have to be spent by some coal operators and owners of
coal property to come into compliance with the storm water regulations. Furthermore, this will all be done under the threat of civil and
criminal enforcement action for violating the Clean Water Act. While
it may be premature at this date for the state or federal government to
take criminal enforcement action on the basis of noncompliance with
the storm water regulatory program, it may be anticipated that at some
point in the future, criminal enforcement action will be taken against
coal operators or owners of coal property for noncompliance. This
potential for future civil and criminal enforcement actions should motivate coal operators and owners of coal property to become more aware
of their potential liabilities under the Clean Water Act. The next section focuses on what a company can do to better understand and minimize its potential liabilities in this regard.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AND OTHER TACTICS TO MINIMIZE CRIMINAL
LIABILrrY IN THE COAL FIELDS

This final section will focus on what operators and owners of coal
property within the coal industry can do to ensure compliance with the
Clean Water Act. In addition, recommendations are made regarding
what action a company may want to take in the event that it finds
itself the target of a criminal investigation for violations of the Clean
Water Act. Unfortunately, many companies still have the attitude that
they have no need to be concerned with the criminal provisions of
environmental statutes as the government only prosecutes the truly bad
actors such as the "midnight dumpers." In fact, a review of the defendants prosecuted criminally by the government reads like a "who's
who" of Fortune 500 companies, and their prosecutions have been for
a wide variety of activities." While relatively few criminal prosecu-

200. See infra app. A; see also Block, supra note 45, at 36 (listing major corporations
prosecuted for environmental violations).
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tions for environmental violations have been filed by the government
against the coal industry, the clear message in Scott and Bryant's
article is that the prosecutions of Mr. Law and MIi are but the first
in a series. Therefore, the coal industry needs to recognize the wake
up call and realize that coal operators and owners of coal property will
not be immune from criminal prosecutions in the future.
The first recommendation regarding compliance with the Clean
Water Act, other environmental statutes, and the new storm water
regulations is for a company to become familiar with those statutes
and attempt to understand their requirements. It has been estimated that
less then five percent of the Fortune 500 companies have an adequate
understanding of environmental, health, and safety laws." 1 To
achieve this goal, management can meet with state regulatory agencies
and attend environmental seminars which are oriented to helping management become better aware of its legal responsibilities under the
myriad of environmental enactments. Had Mr. Law and MMI become
more familiar with the Clean Water Act and the AML program, they
might have arranged in advance of their criminal prosecution for the
State to take action to remediate the Summerlee property and never
have been indicted for the acid mine drainage problems.2°2
The recent civil prosecutions by the State against Rayle Coal
Company, Cat Run Coal Company, Donald Frazee, and Inter-State
Lumber Company should also indicate that had those companies been
more aware of the relevant environmental statutes, they may have not
been targeted for enforcement action. For instance, Rayle Coal Company could have made an inquiry into the types of liabilities on the
ground at the Ohio County site prior to purchasing the property from
Valley Camp Coal Company. Had Rayle Coal company been fully
aware of the water pollution problems at the site, that liability could
201. Roundtable-Managing the Environmental Risks in Acquisition, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, July/Aug. 1989, at 28, 40, quoted in Stephen M. Wheeler & Edward Z. Fox,
Avoiding Environmental Liabilities: A Primer for Business, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 495
(1991).
202. It was recently announced that AML monies were going to be earmarked specifically for acid mine drainage remediation projects. Coal operators and owners of coal property would be wise to investigate their own property to determine if AML funds may be
expended to remediate their water pollution problems.
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have been taken into account during the acquisition process. Likewise,
Cat Run Coal Company and other lessors or contractors of coal mining
property are now on notice, in light of DEP's enforcement action in
Preston County, that third parties may be held accountable for water
pollution problems at a given site. Prudent coal operators and owners
of coal property who are knowledgeable of this fact may want to add
additional language in their contracts or leases to require bonding and
other indemnification for water pollution problems. 3
The second recommendation to minimize future liability is to
conduct an environmental audit" of the company's operations to determine the full ramifications of the Clean Water Act, other environmental statutes and the new storm water regulations on its operations.
Once an environmental audit has been completed, a company can
begin to assess the full ramifications of the Clean Water Act, other
environmental statutes, and the storm water regulatory program, and
determine what, if any, further action it may need to take to ensure
compliance with those laws. In addition to performing an environmental audit, it is recommended that each company develop an environmental compliance program. The parameters of the environmental audit
and compliance program need to be further examined to determine
how those efforts can help avoid civil and criminal liability and minimize exposure once a company becomes targeted in a criminal investigation.

203. The suggestion that coal operators and owners of coal property need to take some
affirmative action to minimize their environmental liabilities is dictated not only by increased enforcement of the Clean Water Act, but also increased enforcement of the Surface
Mining and Reclamation Act and the creation of the Applicant Violator System (AVS)
which has been utilized by DEP and the Office of Surface Mining to prohibit coal operators and owners of coal property from receiving new surface mining permits or permit
modifications as a result of permit violations committed by independent contractors. See
Chauncey S.R. Curtz & Karen J. Greenwell, The Applicant Violator System Under SMCRA:
Ownership and Control Regulations, 6 1. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 143 (1990-91).
204. There are two main forms of environmental audits: compliance audits which utilize
in-house or outside consultants to investigate compliance with environmental laws and regulations; and, management audits which review management risk-control systems and procedures utilized by the company to detect and remedy environmental violations. See generally
Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (1992).
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In considering an environmental audit, the company needs to be
aware of the positive and negative aspects of that audit. In the positive
column are the following factors:
1) Performance of an environmental audit may bring a company into
compliance with environmental laws and regulations;
2) Performance of an environmental audit may assist a company in
developing corporate detection systems and improve communication between layers of management within the company concerning potential
violations;
3) Performance of an environmental audit may be considered by the
Department of Justice in determining whether or not it prosecutes a company;" and,
4) Performance of an environmental audit may facilitate a company in
receiving a downward departure under the sentencing guidelines.'

On the negative side of the column are the following factors that must
be considered:

205. See DOJ GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 25. The DOJ Guidance Document sets

forth several factors that the Department of Justice will consider in weighing whether or not
to take criminal enforcement action, including whether the violator has: 1) made a voluntary
disclosure; 2) cooperated in providing all relevant information concerning the violation; 3)
taken preventative measures and adopted an environmental compliance program to prevent

future noncompliance; 4) engaged in pervasive noncompliance; 5) undertaken internal disciplinary actions against the individual employee violators; and, 6) taken sufficient action in
remedying any ongoing noncompliance.
206. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (1991). Section 8AL2, comment 3(k) encourages organizations to develop an "effective

program to prevent and detect violations of law," although it should be noted that at the
present time the sentencing guidelines for organizations do not apply to environmental violations. Id. § 8C2.1(a).
On Mar. 5, 1993, the Advisory Working Group on Environmental Sanctions to the
United States Sentencing Commission requested public comments on proposed sentencing
guidelines for organizations convicted of federal environmental crimes. At step H(i), the proposed commentary suggests a percentage increase in the basic fine if the organization had
no program to achieve compliance with environmental requirements. Draft of Corporate

Sentencing Guidelines by Advisory Group for Public Review, 23 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2944
(Mar. 12, 1993); Angus Macbeth, Making Environmental Punishment Fit the Crime: Problems in Sentencing Organizationsfor Environmental Offenses, 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1313
(1993).
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1) Performance of an environmental audit may be expensive with regard
to the hiring of consultants and disruption of the company's operations;
2) The environmental audit may later be disclosed and that disclosure
could lead to increased civil and criminal liability by establishing the actual knowledge of company officials;' and,
3) The environmental audit may lead to the discovery of reportable
environmental problems and that will require the company to immediately
grapple with whether or not to report the violation to government agencies
and develop a remediation program.

In conducting an environmental audit, a company will typically

hire outside consultants to inspect, evaluate, and report on the
company's operations and their environmental compliance. Consideration should be given to the selection of a consultant who can properly evaluate the company's operations and its environmental concerns.
A written contract should be entered into setting forth the costs and
expenses to be reimbursed and the scope of the audit. 208 Sometimes,
the company may want to coordinate the environmental audit through
its legal division or outside counsel to shield any final report under the
claim of privilege. 2 9
In creating an environmental compliance program, a company may
also hire an outside consultant or designate a member of management

207. Pursuant to EPA's Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004,
25,007 (1986), EPA has a policy of not "routinely request[ing] environmental audit reports,"
but this policy does not prohibit EPA from requesting a copy of an environmental audit in
a given situation. On the other hand, DOJ's Guidance Document contemplates that environmental audits will be disclosed to the government. DOJ GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note
25, at 4-5.
208. Environmental consultants typically perform environmental audits in three phases:
Phase I consists of a site reconnaissance, a review of relevant permit files, and other historical documents and interviews with knowledgeable persons; Phase II consists of more invasive inspection techniques such as soil borings and samplings, water samplings, and laboratory analyses; Phase I consists of remediation design and clean-up oversight. A company
needs to clearly define for the environmental consultant exactly what type of environmental
audit it wants performed and what budget it has available for the project.
209. The attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the critical self-analysis privilege have not met with a great deal of success in preventing the disclosure of an
environmental audit to government agencies. See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 204, at 37692.
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to review existing company procedures to detect environmental violations and make new recommendations for the compliance program. The
environmental compliance program must be drafted carefully to ensure
that the company meets its legal duties under the statutes and that it
does not create any new standards of liability not already required by
law. The components of an environmental compliance program include:
development of corporate environmental principles and standards; dedication of management at a sufficient level to ensure implementation;
the commitment of adequate funding, personnel and resources to the
project; a formal training program developed for all employees; routine
auditing programs developed to maintain compliance; development of
response procedures for violations detected; and, internal disciplinary
procedures to be taken after violations are detected.21 The company
may also wish to include as a part of its environmental compliance
program the procedures that a company will follow in the event of a
catastrophic environmental event.
Use of company environmental compliance programs is greatly
increasing, and reports reflect that almost sixty percent of respondents
in a recent survey indicated that they had adopted such a policy.21 '
In considering whether or not a company should adopt an environmental compliance program, one should note that it is often the case that a
company is prosecuted criminally, not because its conduct was more
outrageous than another company's conduct, but because it is perceived
as having a bad attitude with regard to compliance with environmental
laws.
It has also been observed that government agencies may be
more willing to overlook minor legal violations if they believe that a
company is making a good faith effort to comply with the law and it

210. For a complete discussion concerning the establishment of an environmental compliance program, see James T. Banks et al., Developing and Implementing an Environmental
Corporate Compliance Program, C776 ALI-ABA 107, Sept. 1992, at 109, available in
WESTLAW, ENV-TP database. The elements of the environmental compliance program are
designed to meet the six factors established in the DOJ GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note
25.
211. STANFORD UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BusINEss, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANSFORMATION

OF U.S.

INDUSTRY:

A SURVEY

OF U.S.

INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATIONS

(1990), quoted in Wheeler & Fox, supra note 201, at 497.
212. See Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Overcriminalization
and Too Severe Punishment, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,658, 10,662 (1991).
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has adopted policies to ensure compliance with environmental
laws. 213 Governmental agencies prefer to be taken seriously and the
company's adoption of an environmental compliance program serves to
demonstrate to the government that a company is sensitive to the legal
ramifications of the environmental statutes.
Despite the company's best efforts at minimizing its exposure to
criminal liability, there may come a time that the company runs afoul
of some environmental law and finds itself the target of a criminal investigation. In the event that a company finds itself in that precarious
position, it needs immediately to assemble its defense team of key
management personnel and outside criminal counsel. 214 That team
needs to respond to the government's investigation as it proceeds, it
needs to coordinate its own internal investigation within the company,
and it needs to handle inquiries from the media. After the defense
team completes its internal investigation, it needs to report its findings
to management. Then the company must determine if it will cooperate
with the government's investigation or if it will defend its conduct and
resist the investigation.
The company may chose to cooperate with the government, but at
the same time persuade the government that further criminal action is
not necessary on the government's part as other civil enforcement
action may be more appropriate. In following this scenario, a company
should be mindful of the following factors which are typically considered by the government in determining whether or not it will proceed
with a criminal prosecution:
1. Nature of the misconduct.
a. Was there actual injury to the environment or to people-if so,

how serious?

213. Wheeler & Fox, supra note 201, at 498.
214. For a thorough discussion of how to handle a government investigation in the
context of an environmental violation, see Henry W. Killeen, II & Nelson Perel, Facing

the Caualry: Advising the Corporate Client, C776 ALI-ABA 53, Sept. 1992, at 54, available in WESTLAW, ENV-TP database; Robert S. Bennett et al., The Role of Internal Investigation in Defending against Charges of Corporate Misconduct, C496 ALI-ABA 207, Apr.
1990, at 125. available in WESTLAW, ENV-TO database.
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b. Did the misconduct relate only to record keeping or some other
ministerial violation?
c. Is this an aberration or an isolated transaction, in contrast to ongoing and repetitive unlawful behavior?
d. Was the violation knowingly and deliberately committed, or was it
the result of an accident or a mistake?
e. Did management personnel know about the violation-if so, what
did they know; when did they learn about it and what did they do?
f. Was the misconduct contrary to published corporate policy or express instructions?
2. Corporation's compliance record.
a. Did the company cooperate with the government's investigation, or
did it try to conceal facts and deceive the government?
b. Does the company have an environmental audit program or other
compliance policies?
c. Has the company made voluntary disclosures in the past, and, if
so, how promptly has the company made such disclosures after learning of a violation?
d. What measures has the company implemented to eliminate the
possibility of additional violations?
e. Will punishment serve any useful purpose?" 5

A review of these factors indicates that those companies that have
already implemented an environmental compliance program should be
in a better position to convince the government that it has handled and
will continue to handle properly its environmental problems, and therefore, a company that has already implemented an environmental compliance program should be in a better position to derail the criminal
investigation.
One of the functions of the defense team in advising management
in an ongoing environmental investigation is to help devise creative
settlement alternatives. The settlement in the Exxon Valdez matter has
been cited to as an example of how a company can act responsibly
and creatively to minimize liability exposure.216 Because of Exxon's
215. Thomas C. Green & Keith E. Welks, Management of a Response to an Environmental Criminal Investigation, 776 AU-ABA 77, Sept. 1992, at 85-86, available in WESTLAW, ENV-TP database.
216. Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. & Nancy A. Voisin, Enforcement Trends, 776 ALI-ABA 21,
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cooperation, the government allowed Exxon to remit $125 million in
criminal fines and to remit one dollar for every twenty dollars spent
by Exxon in remediating the oil spill.2 17 The Exxon plea agreement
also sets forth over $100 million in payments by Exxon to be used for
restoration projects within Alaska.2 1 This type of plea agreement indicates what the government will accept if a company is willing to
admit responsibility for its actions and expend the necessary money to
219
remediate the violations.
At the same time that the defense team is attempting to secure a
satisfactory resolution of the case with the government, it needs to
prepare for trial in an expeditious manner. Discussion of the many
steps a defense team must follow in order to prepare for the trial of a
complex environmental criminal prosecution is beyond the scope of
this Article, but some of the more obvious points merit some discussion.22 0 One of the first issues that the defense team will have to resolve is whether or not separate counsel needs to be retained for the
company and any of the targeted employees. 221 While representation
of the company employees and the company by one counsel has many
advantages, including the presentation to the government of a case

with a united front, many issues may develop into conflicts of interest
(Sept. 1992) at 32, available in WESTLAW, JLR database.
217. Id. at 33-34.
218. IM. at 34.
219. Of course the amounts paid by Exxon were quite high given the magnitude of the
oil spill. It should not be expected that voluntary compliance for most companies will be
near as expensive. It should be noted that creative negotiations and settlements with EPA in
civil cases has led to satisfactory results for many companies. See Steven C. Jones, Creativity Helps Companies Cut Penalties, NAT'L L.L, Aug. 17, 1992, at 18-21. It should also be
noted that if a company is not able to derail a criminal investigation and it finds itself
convicted of an environmental offense, the company should attempt to negotiate a creative
sentence through "alternative sentencing" on the basis of its cooperation and good faith in
handling the environmental violation. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1167.
220. One of the best articles that sets forth how to handle an environmental criminal
prosecution from the defense perspective is Stephen D. Brown & Alison M. Benders, How
to Handle a Complex Criminal Environmental Case, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149 (1990); see
also Killeen & Perel, supra note 214.
221. For a thorough discussion of the conflicts of interest that can arise between a
company and its employees, see David M. Zornow, Representation of The Corporation and
its Employees in an Environmental Criminal Case, C496 AI-ABA 207, 209 (Apr. 1990),
available in WESTLAW, JLR database; McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1166.
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between the company and the employee. For instance, the company
may want to argue that it is not liable for the conduct of its employee
because his acts were not within the scope of his employment and his
acts were not for the benefit of the company. Problems can also arise
if the government is willing to plea bargain with an individual defendant but not with the company. This conflict of interest issue needs to
be evaluated early by the defense team and a decision upon the appropriate course of action in this regard should be made as soon as possible.
Another issue that needs to be focused upon quickly by the defense team is a response to any government search warrants. Sometimes, a company is not aware that it has been targeted for an environmental criminal investigation until the FBI and EPA show up with
a search warrant. In that situation, a company will have to respond as
best as it is able with in-house personnel. If a company is aware that
it has been targeted for an environmental criminal investigation, it may
arrange for the retention of outside experts to be prepared and on hand
when the government executes its search warrant. A company that has
in-house or retained experts on hand is better prepared to respond to
the government's search warrant because its expert will be able to
observe and monitor all of the government's actions and take samples
in the same manner and at the same time as the government. This
defense move allows the company to have its own set of samples that
can be evaluated independently of the government and provide the
company with information that will be necessary for the defense.
The outside consultant that is retained by the company to observe
the government's search will be a key member of the defense team.
As with any environmental case, the issues often boil down to a battle
of expert opinions at trial. The defense team needs to make sure that
it retains a knowledgeable expert consultant that will be able to assist
the defense team in reviewing: the relevant statutes and regulations;
the analytical data that is generated by the defense sampling program;
and, the results of the government's sampling program. The consultant
also needs to be selected on the basis of how well he will be able to
present complex information in a simple manner, given the fact that
any trial will be conducted before a jury.
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With regard to this latter point, environmental counsel in criminal
cases need to be reminded to keep their case as simple as possible for
the benefit of the court and the jury. Most environmental counsel are
used to trying cases in an administrative hearing context, and in that
setting it does not matter if the case is complex. At the district court
level, most courts are not used to trying complex criminal cases and
defense counsel should be mindful of their duty to educate the court
and the jury. An environmental criminal case will also differ from an
administrative proceeding in that the case will be prosecuted by the
United States Attorney's Office which has at its disposal the full resources of the United States Government, including the Department of
Justice in Washington, D.C., the EPA, and the FBI. These are certainly
significant resources that the defense team will have to match to properly defend their client.
Finally, in discussing strategies for trial, it should be mentioned
that presenting a responsible company position is key to a good defense. From a review of the transcript in Law, it is apparent that the
court did not believe that the defendants had acted with responsibility
in regard to their environmental liabilities. Once a district court concludes that a company has not acted responsibly under the law, it may
be predicted that the court will be less willing to rule with the company on critical evidentiary points and other legal issues, including jury
instruction disputes. 222 The loss of the district court's respect in this
manner can obviously have devastating consequences for the defendants in an environmental criminal prosecution.
Currently the government's conviction rate is greater then eighty
percent in environmental criminal prosecutions. 2 3 Coupled with this
statistic is the fact that district courts are now willing to hand out
record sentences and fines in environmental criminal prosecutions.
Environmental counsel representing companies and individuals in feder222. The record in Law is replete with examples of the district court's demeanor towards the defendants which suggest that the court was not satisfied with the defendants
conduct in that case. See supra note 8 for one such example.
223. Block, supra note 45, at 34. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of West Virginia advised the author that this figure is relatively low as the average
prosecution rate for drug offenses is above ninety percent. Conversation with Phillip B.
Scott, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of West Virginia (Jan. 11, 1993).
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al court needs to be fluent not only with the intricacies of environmental statutes, but must also be familiar and advise their client with regard to the federal sentencing guidelines. 4 A review of several of
the recent reported Clean Water Act cases, set forth in Appendix A,
indicates that it is very common for the issue on to be an allegation
that the sentencing guidelines were not .applied properly by the district
court rather than an appeal of the substantive violation of the Clean
Water Act.22 The sentencing guidelines bring a whole new dynamic

to the representation of parties in federal court, and resolution of an
environmental criminal prosecution can often turn to negotiations over
when a defendant should receive a downward departure or an enhancement, and, when the government fails to keep its commitment regarding the plea agreement, as occurred in Goldfaden, the defendant will
have an ability to appeal on that basis alone.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The decisions in Law and Rayle Coal Co., and the recent civil
enforcement action involving Cat Run Coal Company should serve as
notice to coal operators and the owners of coal property that the state
and federal governments plan to increase their enforcement of all environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act. Each coal operator
and owner of coal property needs to be prepared to defend its conduct
under the level of scrutiny that may be applied to a defendant in federal district court. The time is ripe for coal operators and owners of
coal property to focus on their potential liabilities under the Clean
Water Act, other environmental statutes and EPA's storm water regula-

224. See supra note 58. For a discussion and criticism of the application of the sentencing guidelines to environmental violations, see Benjamin S. Sharp, The (Mis)Application
of the Sentencing Guidelines to Environmental Crimes, C496 ALI-ABA 291, Apr. 1990, at
291, available in WESTLAW, ENV-TP database and Starr & Kelly, supra note 58. The
United States Sentencing Commission is currently evaluating the application of the sentencing guidelines in the environmental context, particularly with regard to their application to
organizations. 57 Fed. Reg. 32,246 (1992). The Advisory Working Group on Environmental
Sanctions recently proposed new sentencing guidelines for corporations. See supra note 206.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 300 (1991); United
States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1991).
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tory program. With proper attention to the legal liabilities imposed by
these statutes and regulations, the coal industry should be able to'continue to operate in a cost effective manner with some modifications to
their manor of operations. Owners of property with abandoned or inactive coal mining operations that have water discharge problems will to
make the biggest adjustment as heretofore those inactive operations
have not been regulated under the Clean Water Act.
The recent conviction of Mr. Law and MMI is intended to
serve as a warning by the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of West Virginia that it intends to use the Clean
Water Act to monitor the environmental practices of the coal industry
and step in and prosecute those companies that are in noncompliance.
In order for a company to avoid the same fate as Mr. Law and MMI,
a company should review its existing environmental practices through
an environmental audit and, the company should further consider the
implementation of an environmental compliance program. As the new
sentencing guidelines for organizational defendants are promulgated,
this proposal will become virtually mandatory.
Should a coal company find itself a defendant in the United
States District Court, it needs to be prepared to marshal its resources
and adequately defend it and its employees conduct. As suggested in
this article, there are still areas such as the requisite knovledge of the
defendant, the public welfare doctrine and the responsible corporate
officer doctrine that may be exploited as potential defenses. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of West Virginia
has unofficially sounded the charge and the coal industry needs to rise
to the occasion and be prepared to meet an era of increased civil and
criminal environmental enforcement.
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APPENDIX A
CLEAN WATER AcT CRIMINAL CASES-REPORTED

1.

United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1993).

A federal employee who worked at a Naval Air Station in Alaska
challenged his conviction on one count of knowingly discharging a
pollutant and two counts of negligently discharging a pollutant in
violation of the Clean Water Act under Section 309(c)(2) alleging that
he was not a person subject to the enforcement provisions of the law.
The defendant was sentenced by the district court to serve ten months
on each count to be served concurrently. The court of appeals summarily rejected the defendants argument ruling that a federal employee
was a person covered by the Clean Water Act.
2.

United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. -Ct. 1844 (1993).

Prosecution under section 309(c)(2) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(2), against Mr. Law and his company Mine Management, Inc.
Mr. Law was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. He and
his company were each fined $80,000. The court of appeals rejected
the defendants argument that they did not add a pollutant and therefore
the discharge was not in violation of the Clean Water Act. The court
also rejected the defendants jury instruction and evidentiary arguments.
3.

United States v. Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 978 F.2d 1259
(6th Cir. 1992) (table, text available in WESTLAW).

The company and two individual defendants conditionally pled
guilty to a four count indictment for knowingly discharging pollutants
into waters of the United States in violation of section 309(c)(2). The
defendants' appeal was based upon their Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that their discharge through a pipe into a nearby pond was not
a navigable water of the United States covered under the Clean Water
Act. The court of appeals considered prior case law with regard to the
definition of navigable waters of the United States and upheld the
district court's denial of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
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United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992).

In a prosecution for "knowing endangerment" under the Clean
Water Act, section 309(c)(3), the court of appeals reversed a conviction upon concluding that even though the defendant knowingly violated Section 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317, as a result of discharges in violation of the pretreatment standards, and the defendant knew that he was
placing his employees in imminent danger of bodily injury as a result
of his employees coming into contact with dangerous chemical solutions poured into sinks, the Clean Water Act was not intended by
Congress to regulate worker safety and therefore, "a knowing endangerment prosecution cannot be premised upon danger that occurs before the pollutant reaches a publicly-owned sewer or treatment works."
The court of appeals specifically rejected any reliance by the government upon the "public welfare offense" doctrine to justify the
defendant's prosecution for knowing endangerment.
5.

United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 217 (1992).

Prosecution under section 309(c)(2), against Mr. Ellen, an environmental consultant, for knowingly filling in wetlands without a permit.
Mr. Ellen was convicted and the district court imposed a sentence of
six months imprisonment and one year of supervised release with the
latter conditioned upon four months home detention and sixty hours of
community service. Mr. Ellen defended upon the grounds that the
government did not prove that he knew that the areas where he was
working were wetlands and that permits were required. The Fourth
Circuit rejected Mr. Ellen's argument as it determined that the definitions contained within the wetlands manuals in question were merely
an interpretive guide and there had been no change in the law. The
Fourth Circuit also rejected Mr. Ellen's argument that the sentencing
guidelines were applied improperly in his case and it affirmed the
conviction.
In a related criminal prosecution discussed at footnote 1, the court
of appeals noted that Mr. Paul Jones, the owner of the property and
the person who hired Mr. Ellen as a consultant, pleaded guilty to one

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

77

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:691

count of negligently filling wetlands. Mr. Jones was placed on probation for eighteen months and ordered to: pay a million dollar criminal
fine; pay a million dollars for restoration of the property to its original
condition; and, place twenty-five hundred acres of property in a conservation trust.
6.

United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992).

In September 1990 Mr. Goldfaden and his company were indicted
for violating the Clean Water Act by discharging hazardous and industrial waste into the Dallas sewer system without a permit. Mr.
Goldfaden pleaded guilty to one count of a superseding indictment for
discharge of industrial waste into the Dallas sewer system, a violation
of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(a) and in return the government agreed to
dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and to make no recommendation as to Mr. ,Goldfaden's sentence. Under the sentencing guidelines, Mr. Goldfaden was sentenced to the maximum for his offense,
36 months. Mr. Goldfaden appealed the application of the sentencing
guidelines and the Fifth Circuit remanded the case because the government had violated its pledge to remain silent.
7.

United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992).

Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Brouillette operated a town water system on
a part time basis and they were indicted on 34 counts of violating 18
U.S.C. §§ 371 & 1001 for making false statements and filing false
reports concerning the results of monthly turbidity reports. The court
of appeals, on an interlocutory appeal, reversed the district, court's
decision to suppress certain statements made to EPA Special Agents
from the Criminal Investigation division upon the grounds that the
defendants had not been given their Miranda warnings. The court of
appeals did note however, that the district court may have suppressed
the statements because of its view that prosecution overkill had occurred, and the court of appeals expressed its view that the prosecution
should proceed in a "common sense" manner upon remand.
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United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1991).

A thirty-seven count indictment was filed against two corporations
and nineteen individuals for violations of RCRA, CERCLA, and the
Clean Water Act in the operation of a bulk liquid chemical transfer
and storage facility. At the conclusion of the government's case the
district court granted all of the defendants' judgments of acquittal on
all but eleven counts of the indictment which left remaining one company and three individuals. The jury returned a guilty verdict as to the
remaining eleven counts and the district court struck the guilty verdicts
with regard to the individual defendants and it struck all but two of
the convictions for the company and ordered new trials.
The Clean Water Act counts of the indictment pertained to the
willful or negligent discharge of pollutants in waste water from a
Baytank out-fall into Galvaston Bay's Bayport Turning Basin in violation of a NPDES permit on numerous occasions over various stated
periods of time and one count of the indictment charged negligent or
willful failure to file discharge monitoring reports as required by the
NPDES permit.
The court of appeals, in examining the pre-1987 amended Clean
Water Act, held that specific intent was not required to establish negligent or willful violations. The court of appeals went on to hold however, that in order to convict someone as an aider or abetter for a
record keeping violation, there must be a specific intent shown. The
court of appeals affirmed the company's two convictions and remanded
the case for a new trial as to the three individuals.
9.

United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 300 (1991).

The defendant pled guilty to eighteen counts of knowingly discharging pollutants into a public sewer system in violation of section
309(c)(2). He was sentenced to five years probation, one thousand
hours of community service and fined $90,000. The government appealed the sentence and argued that the district court had improperly
applied the sentencing guidelines in giving a downward departure. The
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court of appeals agreed that the sentencing guidelines had not been
properly followed and remanded the matter to the district court. The
court of appeals found that the defendant's other business was not a
ground for downward departure. The court of appeals also held that
the district court did not have to impose a mandatory minimum fine of
$5,000 per count because the minimum is not mandatory under the
Clean Water Act since imprisonment or a fine or both is appropriate.
10. United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Brittain was convicted of eighteen felony counts of falsely
reporting a material fact to a government agency under 18 U.S.C. §
1001 and two misdemeanor counts of discharging pollutants into the
waters of the United States in violation of Section 309(c)(1). Mr.
Brittain on appeal argued that the government did not establish materiality as required by § 1001; he is not a "person" who discharged
pollutants as contemplated by the Clean Water Act; and the evidence
was insufficient to prove that he discharged pollutants in violation of
the Clean Water Act. The court of appeals upheld the convictions
under § 1001 because it concluded the government showed that the
defendant was clearly aware of his conduct. The court of appeals also
upheld the defendant's convictions under the Clean Water Act finding
that the defendant was a person subject to the Clean Water Act, even
though he was not the permittee and the evidence was sufficient to
uphold his conviction.
11. United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
Mr. Boldt was one of four defendants named in a fifty-two count
indictment charging numerous violations of the Clean Water Act, including six counts for knowingly discharging into a municipal sewer in
violation of section 309(c)(2). Mr. Boldt worked for Astro Circuit
Corporation, which was in the business of making circuit boards, and
that process resulted in the discharge of industrial waste with toxic
metals. The violations in this case were associated with the company's
failure to comply with pretreatment standards and causing injury to
persons at the waste water treatment plant operated by the city. The
two counts that Mr. Boldt was found guilty of pertained to a violation
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of the pretreatment standards and bypassing the company's pretreatment facility on particular dates. Mr. Boldt defended on the grounds of
impossibility and necessity. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and held that the jury instruction objected to by the defendant
properly took away any defense of economic or business necessity but,
it did not eliminate Mr. Boldt's necessity or impossibility defense.
12. United States v. Wells Metal Finishing,Inc., 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir.
1991).
The defendant and his company were convicted on nineteen counts
of knowingly discharging excessive amounts of zinc and cyanide into a
city sewer system in violation of section 309(c)(2). The defendant was
sentenced to fifteen months in custody to be served concurrently on
each count and one year of supervisory release conditioned on payment
of a $60,000 fine which had previously been levied against the defendant by the city for his violations. On appeal the defendant did not
challenge his conviction rather he challenged the sentence that was
imposed by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed finding
that the trial court was justified in enhancing the offense level for
disruption of a public utility and that the city's $60,000 fine against
the defendant for violating his sewer permit was reasonably related to
the offense and payment of that fine was an appropriate condition of
the defendant's term of supervisory release.
13. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
Mr. Hoflin was the director of a public works department when he
was indicted on two RCRA counts, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) for
improper disposal of hazardous waste and one misdemeanor count under the Clean Water Act, section 309(c)(2), for improperly disposing
of kitchen sludge in violation of a NPDES permit. Mr. Hoflin was
found guilty on. one count of RCRA and the misdemeanor count related to the Clean Water Act. The district court suspended the imposition
of sentence and placed Mr. Hoflin on two years probation and the
court of appeals affirmed. Mr. Hoflin raised several arguments with
regard to the jury instructions on the misdemeanor counts involving
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the Clean Water Act and the court of appeals rejected all of the
defendant's arguments regarding the court's jury instructions.
14. United States v. Marathon Development Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (1st
Cir. 1989).
Marathon Development Corporation and its senior vice president
were indicted on twenty-five counts of violating section 309(c), with
regard to filling in approximately five acres of wetlands without the
proper permit. The defendants attempted to defend by stating that their
conduct was permitted pursuant to a "head waters nationwide permit"
set forth in the Army Corp's of Engineers Regulations. The district
court granted a motion in limine precluding the defense and the defendants entered a conditional plea of guilty preserving the issue for appeal. The district court fined the company $100,000 and imposed on
the company officer a suspended six month sentence, one year of
probation, and a $10,000 fine. The court of appeals upheld the district
court's decision that a defense based on a nationwide permit was not
applicable.
15. United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 827 (1981).
Mr. Distler was prosecuted under section 309(c)(1), as the sole
shareholder of Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corporation, a company that
had been contracted with by Chem-Dyne Corporation to dispose of
Velsicol Chemical Corporation PCL bottoms. The court of appeals
upheld the defendant's criminal prosecution, rejecting the defendant's
evidentiary objections based on grand jury and expert witness testimony. The court 'held that the defendant was properly prosecuted as the
"alter ego" of the corporation. As reported in Richard M. Carter, Note,
Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability
for Water Pollution, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 576, 607 (1980), the
defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $50,000.
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16. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), petition to vacate sentence
denied, 491 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 642 F.2d 59
(3rd Cir. 1981), petition to vacate sentence denied, 546 F. Supp.
713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), af'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
The two Frezzo Brothers and their company, Frezzo Brothers, Inc.,
were found guilty on six counts of an indictment charging them with
willfully or negligently discharging pollutants into a navigable waterway in violation of section 309(c)(1). The corporation was fined
$50,000 and the individual defendants were each fined $25,000 and
sentenced to 30 days in jail. The defendants' convictions were based
on the discharge of waste waters from mushroom compost manufacturing operations into the waters of a navigable waterway without having
a permit. The court of appeals rejected the defendants' arguments that:
the EPA director had to proceed civilly in advance of seeking a criminal indictment; the indictment should have been dismissed because the
EPA had failed to promulgate specific regulations for effluents for the
compost manufacturing business; the evidence failed to support the
convictions of negligent and willful violations of the Act; and, the
district court erred in not allowing a special verdict go to the jury to
determine which counts were willful violations and which were negligent violations.
On a post conviction motion to set aside the conviction the defendants argue that they were exempt from prosecution under EPA regulations. The district court initially rejected these arguments and on appeal the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further consideration of EPA's agricultural exemption. On remand the district court
again rejected the defendants arguments that EPA's regulations created
a defense.
17. United State v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977).
The defendant was tried for violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) for
spilling 200 to 300 gallons of gasoline into Lake St. Clair, Michigan.
The defendant argued that he should not have been prosecuted under
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the Clean Water Act, which imposed greater penalties then the Refuse
Act and other statutes that he could have been prosecuted under. The
court of appeals concluded that gasoline is a pollutant under § 1362
and therefore it upheld the conviction. The court also rejected the
defendant's argument that the Clean Water Act should be narrowly
construed as a penal statute. As reported in Michele Kuruc, Comment,
Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on
Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 93, 103 (1985), the defendant received the minimum
fine of $2,500.
18. Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
The company was convicted of failing to report an oil spill in
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) and it was fined $20,000 and
placed on three years probation. $15,000 of the fine was stayed pending successful completion of the probation period. On appeal the company argued that it was not a "person in charge" required to report
under the Clean Water Act and that the evidence was insufficient in
this regard. The court of appeals rejected the company's arguments
that "person in charge" can only refer to an individual and held that
the term person is defined to include corporations.
19. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317
(6th Cir. 1974).
Ashland Oil was indicted under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) for failing
to immediately report the discharge of 3,200 gallons of oil into Little
Cyprus Creek. The case was tried before the court and Ashland Oil
was found guilty and on recommendation of the United States Attorney
was fined $500. On appeal Ashland Oil claimed that Congress did not
have the Constitutional power to control pollution on non-navigable
tributaries of navigable streams; that the statutes being criminal in
nature should be strictly construed against the government; and, the
fact that Little Cyprus Creek was non-navigable exonerated Ashland
from any requirement to report its oil spill immediately. The court of
appeals held that Congress was within its constitutional authority to
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regulate pollution in the manner that it had in the Clean Water Act
and it rejected all arguments of the defendants.
20. United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
The district court denied the defendants' motion to vacate their
sentences for five counts of violating the Clean Water Act, section
309(c), as a result of filling in wetlands without a permit. The district
court found that most of the defendants alleged grounds were resolved
on the direct appeal. The district court does go to some length to
review the defendants arguments that the ability of the Army Corps of
Engineers to promulgate the definition of navigable waters under 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b) is an impermissible delegation of authority by Congress. The district court suggests that it is sympathetic to several of
the defendants arguments but ultimately concludes that the state of the
law is such that Congress has permissibly delegated its authority to
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers.
21. Hartford Associates v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J.),
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1992).
A company and its principals sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the government from investigating and bringing a 'criminal
action against them for violations of section 404 of the Clean Water
Act regarding the filling of wetlands the parties also sought the return
of documents seized during a search of plaintiff and plaintiffs'
counsel's office. The district court denied the injunction finding: any
non-compliance with the wetlands delineation manuals and the
Johnston Amendment may be raised as defenses to any criminal prosecution; the parties had failed to allege a case or controversy; the
search was not overbroad and the issue of attorney client privilege will
be preserved by a in camera review of the documents seized to determine if any of them are privileged.
22. United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
Mr. Villegas was indicted under sections 309(c)(2) and (3), and
found guilty on four counts of violating the Clean Water Act for a
knowing discharge of pollutants into a navigable water from a point
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source. In a post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal the district
court reversed the conviction on the two counts pertaining to knowing
endangerment and upheld the conviction with regard to the other two
counts for a knowing discharge without a permit.
23. United States v. Pozsgai, No. Cr. 88-00450 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd
mem., 897 F.2d 524 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812,
sentence reduction denied, 757 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 938 (3rd Cir. 1991), fine reduced,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,772 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Mr. Pozsgai was convicted on forty counts of violating the Clean
Water Act for filing in wetlands. He was sentenced to a three year
term of imprisonment, a concurrent term of twenty-seven months imprisonment, a five year term of probation and a one year term of
supervised release and a $200,000 fine for filling in wetlands without
a permit. The conviction was upheld on appeal and, on a motion for
reduction of sentence, the district court rejected the defendant's motion.
The defendant was also ordered to comply with the restoration plan for
the wetland site. On appeal of the motion to reduce the sentence, the
Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and concluded that
a hearing should have been held under the guidelines and the
defendant's ability to pay the fine was a matter to be considered at the
hearing. In 1992, three years after the conviction, the district court
determined that the defendant was unable to pay the fine and reduced
the fine to $5,000.
24. United States v. Alley, 755 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. IM. 1990).
Mr. Robert Alley was the president and owner of U.S. Plating
Corporation and Pioneer Plating Company, Inc. Mr Alley and his two
companies were all indicted on eighty-one counts of violating the
Clean Water Act for waste water discharges in excess of the permitted
levels for various metals under the pre-treatment standard promulgated
by EPA. The indictments were for the willful and negligent discharge
of waste water and knowing discharge of illegal waste water. The
district court denied a motion to dismiss finding that the indictment
adequately alleged the necessary elements of the offense; that the
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defendants could not challenge the ability of EPA to promulgate regulatory pre-treatment standards; and, the indictment does not allege
facts indicating that the Clean Water Act would be unconstitutional as
applied to the defendants.
25. United States v. Ashland Oil Inc.,, 705 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa.

1989).
The district court refused to dismiss an indictment against the
company for violation of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407,411 and
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(1), as a result of the 1988
oil storage tank collapse and oil spill into the Monongahela River. As
noted in a related case, at footnote 1, " Ashland Oil pleaded no contest to the charge and was fined approximately $2.25 million by Judge
Diamond on March 9, 1989." United States v. Ashland Oil, 30 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1439 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
26. United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
The company and three individual defendants were indicted on 28
counts for conspiring to defraud the United States government by
submitting false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 33
U.S.C. §1319(c)(2). The defendants moved to dismiss the indictments
on several grounds including: prosecutorial vindictiveness and misconduct, improper joinder of the parties, the indictment was duplicitous
and multiplicitous, and improper conduct regarding the grand jury. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss.
27. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee, 460 F. Supp. 6

(E.D. Ark 1978).
The Little Rock Sewer Committee and Roland Ouelette were indicted on five counts of submitting false statements to EPA in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). The jury returned a guilty verdict
against the defendant Ouelette and the district court, by request of the
Sewer Committee, considered the liability of the Sewer Committee.
The district court applied the principle of respondeat superior and held
that the Sewer Committee was equally liable.
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28. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Several individuals and the company moved to dismiss their indictments for violations of the Clean Water Act as the result of unpermitted discharges into a stream. The district court noted that uncollected surface rmn-off may, but does not necessarily constitute a discharge
from a point source, and it found that Oxford's Spray Irrigation System could constitute a point source discharge of water. The court also
rejected the defendant's argument that the stream in question was not a
navigable waterway and refused to find that provision unconstitutional
as void for vagueness. The court also rejected an argument that the
criminal prosecution of the defendants without referral to the EPA
Administrator violates fundamental fairness.
29. United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1444 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that
the EPA Administrator did not issue an order under 33 U.S.C. §
1319(a) in advance of the criminal prosecution. The district court
found that there was nothing inherently wrong with a statute providing
both civil and criminal penalties and EPA civil action was not a prerequisite. The court next rejected a duplicity argument on the basis
that the defendants were charged with willful and negligent discharge
of pollutants.
30. United States v. Ouelette, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350 (E.D.
Ark. 1977)
This case is a companion case to the Little Rock Sewer Committee
case discussed above. Prior to the trial the defendant had made a motion to have the court require the government to prove specific intent
in proving the defendants violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), making
false statements to EPA in violation of the Clean Water Act. The
district court required the government to prove that the defendant acted
knowingly, but it did not require the government to prove that the
defendant purposely intended to violate the law.
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31. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz.
1975).
The U.S. Attorney filed an information charging the defendant
with polluting navigable waterways. The defendant moved to dismiss
the information on two grounds: 1) that the term "waters of the United
States" under the Clean Water Act was so vague that it violated the
due process clause; and, 2) the failure of the EPA Administrator to
give a mandatory abatement order pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)
precluded the criminal prosecution in this case. The district court reviewed the discretion of the EPA administrator to act and determined
that the administrator has the option to act either civilly or criminally.
The district court finally analyzed the term "waters of the United
States" and determined that Congress has given fair warning of what
conduct that is criminal.
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APPENDIX B
CLEAN WATER ACT CRIMINAL CASES-UNREPORTED

1.

United States v. Schallom, No. 92-5157, 1993 WL 137002 (4th
Cir. 1993).

Mr. Schallom was prosecuted for four counts of unlawful disposal,
storage, and transportation under RCRA, 42 § U.S.C. 6928(d)(2)(A)
and (d)(5) and knowingly discharging pollutants without a permit in
violation of Section 309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act. He was convicted on the Clean Water Act violation only and he appealed on the
basis that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the conviction, that
the court improperly instructed the jury and that the district court
improperly failed to allow downward departures under the sentencing
guidelines for admitting responsibility and an imperfect defense. The
court of appeals rejected the defendants arguments and upheld the
conviction. The court specifically held that the jury had properly been
instructed on the knowledge component of the offense and that it was
unnecessary for the jury to be given the defendant's proposed motive
instruction.
2.

United States v. Saroni, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2585 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 14, 1993).

Mr. Saroni, the president, and two of his companies were indicted
on five counts of violating the Clean Water Act by discharging
126,000 gallons of food process water into a storm drain over a three
month period in 1991. The waste water was allegedly dumped after
two sanitary districts and another disposal site refused to accept the
waste water. Mr. Saroni entered a guilty plea to two counts of knowingly discharging pollutants without a permit and one of the companies
pled guilty to one felony violation. The government recommended a 24
month sentence and it was accepted by the court. Fines are to be set
by the court at a later date.
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United States v. Girdich, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2266 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 30, 1992).

A retired officer of a municipal sewage treatment agency pled
guilty to making false statements in reports required under the Clean
Water Act. He faces a maximum sentence of two years and a fine of
$250,000.
4.

United States v. Donco Industries, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1315
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1992)

The company was indicted on 15 counts of violating the Clean
Water Act by dredging a channel at its marine repair facility without a
permit.
5.

United States v. Chevron USA, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 404 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 1992)

Chevron pleaded guilty to 65 counts of violating the Clean Water
Act as a result of discharges at an oil and gas platform in the Santa
Barbara Channel. The company agreed to pay a fnie of $6.5 million in
criminal penalties and $1.5 million in civil penalties. The company
was indicted for knowing violations of the Clean Water Act because it
exceeded its oil and gas discharge limits on its NPDES permit between
1982 and 1987.
6.

United States v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,512 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1992).

The pharmaceutical company pled guilty to illegally discharging
pollutants from its Syracuse, New York facility into a county waste
water treatment plant and discharging chemical solvents without a state
permit required under Clean Water Act. The company agreed to pay a
$3.5 million dollar fine as follows: $1.75 million into the enforcement
account of New York's Department of Environmental Conservation;
$1.25 million will fund the state's clean-up of Onondaga Lake near
Syracuse; and, $500,000 will be paid as a criminal penalty. The government agreed to suspend $3 million of the original $3.5 million
sought in criminal penalties in exchange for the company paying resti-
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tution to the State. In addition the company agreed to construct a
waste water treatment plant at its Syracuse facility which was estimated to cost between $10 and 20 million.
7.

United States v. Jordan, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,422
(D. Or. Mar. 24, 1992).

A former environmental control supervisor for Ore-Ida Foods pled
guilty to ordering lab technicians to take inaccurate water samples
required under the company's NPDES permit which resulted in discharges into the Snake River in excess of the BOD and total suspended solid standards. The employee faces up to $250,000 in fines and
two years imprisonment. The employee had been indicted on five
counts of knowingly discharging pollutants into the Snake River, two
counts of falsifying discharge reports, and one count of altering waste
water monitoring equipment required under the NPDES permit. The
judge who accepted the plea had previously denied the employee's
argument that he was not subject to criminal 'prosecution due to his
corporate employee status.
8.

United States v. Mills, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,742
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 1991), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,422 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 1992).

Mr. Holm, an employee of a consulting engineering firm, pled
guilty to two counts of an indictment charging him with Clean Water
Act violations and falsifying material information within the jurisdiction of federal agencies. The indictment alleged that Mr. Holm and
others conspired to defraud the federal government to obtain financing
for a self contained secondary treatment plant from the Farmers Home
Administration of the Department of Agriculture by attempting to
conceal the inadequacy of the effluent spray shield component of the
facility by installing a system of pipes, swells and culverts around the
field to eliminate excess waste water and storm water runoff. The
pipes and swells caused unauthorized discharges into navigable waters
in violation of the Clean Water Act.
Mr. Mills was sentenced to ten months imprisonment followed by
five and one half years of supervised probation, and was ordered to
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pay $72,000 in restitution to the Farmers Home Administration and the
town of Zolfo Springs, Florida for Clean Water Act violations as set
forth above. In addition, the consulting firm which was hired to design
and construct the waste water treatment plant was sentenced to five
years probation and ordered to pay $72,000 in restitution.
9.

United States v. Floyd, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,495
(D.S.C. May 22, 1991), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,358
(D.S.C. Jan. 30, 1992).

The superintendent and captain of a dredge were indicted on seven
counts of Clean Water Act violations for discharging tons of dredged
spoil into the Cooper River in South Carolina without a permit. The
indictments charged the defendants with conspiracy to violate the
Clean Water Act, violating the Act, and perjury. The indictments alleged that the two men conspired to illegally discharge dredged spoils
into the river without a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. A
permit had been issued by the Corps authorizing the discharge of
dredged spoils onto a designated on-land disposal site, but not into the
Cooper River. The dredging company was fined $100,000 and placed
on probation for a year for this same offense.
10. United States v. Ruetz, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,742
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 4, 1991), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envfl. L. Inst.)
10,150 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1991).
Enviro-Analysis, Inc. and its president were each found guilty of
three felony counts of mail fraud, nine felony counts of making false
statements under RCRA, one misdemeanor count of filing a false statement under the Clean Water Act and one felony count of causing the
filing of a false statement in a discharge monitoring report with a
government agency. It is reported that this is one of the first federal
criminal trials focusing on an environmental laboratory submission of
false reports. The president was sentenced to four years probation, a
$14,000 fine and 200 hours of community service. The company was
fined $14,000.
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11. United States v. Pleasant, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,692 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 1991), 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,080 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 1991).
Two company officials pled guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The defendants pumped
water contaminated with diesel fuel from underground storage tanks in
an excavated pit into a storm sewer that emptied into Holstein River.
The Court ordered each defendant to pay a $3,000 fine and one defendant was ordered to pay $3,800 in restitution to the City and State.
12. United States v. Brightleaf Sewage Treatment, Inc., 21 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,742 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 1991).
A company that operated a private sewage treatment plant pled
guilty to a felony violation of the Clean Water Act and was ordered to
pay a $350,000 fine and convey ownership of the plant to a corporation owned by local homeowners. The company was charged with
willfully discharging into a tributary of the Salt River in violation of
its NPDES permit. The company president was also a defendant, and
he was additionally required to publish a public apology and was
permanently barred from taking part in the operation of sewage treatment facilities.
13. United States v. Alt, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,742
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 1991).
Mr. Alt was indicted for knowingly discharging solvent washes
and water washes generated during the ink formulation process into
McKellar Lake without a permit. He plead guilty to one count of a
felony indictment under the Clean Water Act. The company, Croda,
Inc., plead guilty in June, 1991 to the negligent discharge of chemical
waste and it was ordered to pay a $200,000 fine, perform remedial
action at the facility site and issue a public apology. Two other employees plead guilty to concealing an environmental crime in connection with the investigation of the violations at the site and on October
4, 1991 all three employees were sentenced to one year of probation.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/7

94

Arceneaux: Potential Criminal Liability in the Coal Fields under the Clean W

1993]

CWA PROSECUTIONS-A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

785

14. United States v. Strandquist, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)

10,692 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 1991).
A Maryland marina and its manager were indicted on three counts
of violating the Clean Water Act by discharging raw sewage into a

tributary of the Chesapeake Bay. The indictment alleged that the defendants periodically discharged raw sewage removed from a camp site
holding tanks into a culvert on marina property and the culvert discharged into a boat basin into a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay.
15. United States v. New York Bus Service, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,494 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1991).
A bus service was fined $25,000 for violations of the Clean Water
Act arising from the discharge of ethylene glycol from bus radiators

directly into the ground. The discharge then drained into the Hutchinson River in Bronx, New York.
16. United States v. Airolight Chrome Plating, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,443 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 1991).
A shift supervisor at a chrome plating facility in Reno, Nevada
was sentenced to three years probation, $1,000 fine and twenty-fifty
hours of community service for a knowing violation of the Clean
Water Act's pretreatment standards. The. plant manager dumped low
PH material into the local publicly owned treatment works during 1987
and 1988. The corporation was previously convicted although the jury
acquitted the company president.
17. United States v. Saunders Asbestos Service, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,443 (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 1991).
An asbestos removal company and its foreman were sentenced for
illegally discharging asbestos laden waste into the Charles River. The
district court sentenced the foreman to two months in jail for directing
his employees to wet down asbestos and dispose of the waste by
pumping it into a street in Brookline, Mass. The corporation was fimed
$5,000 and given two years probation.
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18. United States v. Ramagosa, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,443 (N.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1991).
Two real estate developers and their companies were indicted for
illegally filling wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act. The
indictment charges the developer with filling fifty-four acres of
wetlands in adjacent waterways during construction work between 1982
and 1989 at their twenty-five hundred acre property.
19. United States v. Pond, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,444
(D.Md. Apr. 17, 1991).
A former waste water treatment supervisor was given an eight
month jail term for falsifying discharge monitoring reports and for
stealing government property. The supervisor was convicted on eight
counts of.falsifying discharge monitoring reports, one count of violating a permit condition and one count of stealing waste water treatment
supplies.
20. United States v. Lambert, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,658, 10,661 (D.N.H. 1990).
Mr. Lambert pled guilty to filling in wetlands and agreed to restore his property, deed five acres of woodlands to the state, pay a
$5,000 fine and he was placed on probation.
21. United States v. Exxon, No. CR A90-015, (D. Alaska Feb. 27,
1990), reported in Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 179 (1992).
Exxon Shipping Company and Exxon Corporation were indicted
on five counts each for violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse
Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act and the Dangerous Cargoes Act. Exxon Shipping Company pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of the Clean Water Act, Refuse
Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Exxon plead guilty to a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The parties agreed to payment
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of a $125 million fine ($25 million in fines to the federal government
and $100 million as restitution to the state and federal government.
22. United States v. Ballard Shipping Co., No. 89-01251 (D.R.I.
1989), reported in Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 179 (1992) and Robert W. Adler & Charles
Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 781 (1991).
The company was indicted and pled guilty to one count of negligently violating the Clean Water act as a result of the World Prodigy
oil spill. The company was fined $500,000 and was ordered to pay
restitution to Rhode Island in the amount of $500,000. The Captain of
the ship also pled guilty to one violation of the Clean Water Act and
was fined $10,000.
23. United States v. McKiel, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096
(D. Mass. June 29, 1989).
Mr. McKiel, the president of the company, pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act and RCRA as a result of discharging
48,000 gallons a day of waste water containing copper, lead, and nickel into city sewers. He was ordered to serve four months of his one
year jail sentence.
24. United States v. Pennwalt Corp., No. CR-88-55T (W.D. Wash
1989), reported in Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781
(1991).
The company and four individuals were indicted for violations of
the Clean Water Act as a result of a discharge of 75,000 gallons of
sodium dichromate into the Hylebos Waterway and Puget Sound. The
company entered into a plea agreement and it agreed to pay a

$500,000 fine and $600,000 into a trust fund for the United states
Coast Guard. The charges against all of the individuals except one
were dismissed and that individual was fined $5,000.
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25. United States v. Schwitters, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 607 (W.D.
Wash. 1986).
A Seattle ship-cleaning company and its president were convicted
of three counts of unlawful discharges of spent abrasive blasting grit
and paint materials, into Lake Union. The defendants were acquitted
on one of the counts of the indictment.
26. United States v. Woeck, No. CR86-128W (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1,
1986), reported in Nittoly, Current Trends in the Prosecution of
Environmental Offenses, ALI-ABA Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws (Apr. 1990).
Three company officials with Marine Power & Equipment Co.
pled guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act as a result of dumping toxic waste into a lake and river in Washington. The officials
received a sentence of five days in jail, three years on probation, and
300 hours of community service.
27. United States v. Ralston Purina, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,257 (W.D. Ky. 1982)
The defendant pled guilty to violations of the Refuse Act, the
Clean water Act and CERCLA as a result of a discharge of 18,000
gallons of hexane into the sewer system which caused explosions within the Louisville sewer system and the diversion of untreated water
into the Ohio River. The defendant was fined $62,500.
28. United States v. Manfred DeRewal, No. 77-287 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
reported in Richard M. Carter, Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability for Water Pollution, 10
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 576, 606 (1980).
The owner manager of a company and four employees were convicted of violating 33 U.S.C.§ 1319(c)(1) of the Clean Water Act as a
result of pouring liquid wastes into a storm sewer. DeRewal was fined
$20,000, sentenced to six months in jail and placed on four and onehalf years probation, and the four employees received three years probation.
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29. United States v. Blue Lagoon Marina, No. 75-80824 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 1975), reported in Michele Kuruc, Comment, Putting
Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & WATER L. Rnv. 93, 103 (1985).
This criminal prosecution against the corporation grew out of the
same facts set forth in United States v. Hamel, digest no. 17, Appendix A. The corporation was acquitted by the jury.
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